Thursday, September 19, 2013

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (CARB)

Sep 18: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 12-15131 & 12-15135. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. In this partially split decision, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment, and vacated the district court's preliminary injunction and remanded in an action which alleged that California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard, violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o). There were many parties in the case and a number of states including Michigan filed an amicus brief opposing the California standard. The court staff summarized the opinion as follows:
 
    The panel held that the Fuel Standard's ethanol provisions were not facially discriminatory, and reversed that portion of the district court's decision and remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of California Air Resources Board ("CARB"). The panel also reversed the district court's decision that the Fuel Standard was an impermissible
extraterritorial regulation and the panel directed that an order of partial summary judgment be entered in favor of CARB on those grounds. The panel remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the ethanol provisions discriminate in purpose or effect and, if not, to apply the balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970).
 
    The panel affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Fuel Standard's crude oil provisions (the 2011 Provisions), were not facially discriminatory, but reversed the district court's holding that the 2011 Provisions were discriminatory in purpose and effect. The panel directed the district court to enter an order of partial summary judgment in favor of CARB on those issues. The panel remanded to the district court to apply the Pike balancing test to the 2011 Provisions.
 
    The panel affirmed the district court's conclusion that Section 211(c)(4)(b) of the Clean Air Act does not insulate California from scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.
 
    The panel remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction. The panel expressed no opinion on plaintiffs' claim that the Fuel Standard is preempted by the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The panel also expressed no opinion on CARB's claim that the savings clause in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 precludes implied preemption by the RFS.
 
    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Murguia agreed with the majority's conclusions concerning the crude oil regulations and preemption under the Clean Air Act. She dissented from the majority's conclusion that ethanol regulations do not facially discriminate against interstate commerce.
 
    In part, the Appeals Court stated: "California should be encouraged to continue and to expand its efforts to find a workable solution to lower carbon emissions, or to slow their rise. If no such solution is found, California residents and people worldwide will suffer great harm. We will not at the outset block California from developing this innovative, nondiscriminatory regulation to impede global warming. If the Fuel Standard works, encouraging the development of alternative fuels by those who would like to reach the California market, it will help ease California's climate risks and inform other states as they attempt to confront similar challenges."

    Tim O'Connor, Director of Environmental Defense Fund's (EDF's) California Climate Initiatives commented on the decision saying, "This is a great day for public health and the economy of California. The court clearly upheld a groundbreaking policy that will protect consumers and the environment by diversifying our fuel mix and providing more choices for a clean energy future."

    Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Senior Attorney, David Pettit said, "Today's victory ensures Californians are given better, cleaner choices at the fuel pump, which is something everyone can support. This policy will spur American ingenuity to produce cleaner fuels with fewer impacts to our environment. The standard is working to reduce pollution while decreasing the state's reliance on oil. "We're already on track to achieve these goals, and today's ruling reaffirms California as a national leader for common sense actions to curb climate change."
 
    Access the complete opinion and partial dissent (click here). Access a release from NRDC (click here). Access a release from EDF (click here). [#Energy/Fuel, #Climate, #MIEnergy/Fuel, #MIClimate, #CA9]

NRIC v. NPCC

Sep 18: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-72104. Appealed from the Northwest Power and Conservation Council. The panel affirmed the Sixth Northwest Power Plan, adopted by the Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Council (NPCC), concerning a "due consideration" challenge to the accommodation of fish and wildlife interests with hydropower interests in the Columbia River Basin, and remanded on a limited basis for additional consideration.
 
    The Appeals Court explains that the present case is the latest round of environmental litigation in the 33-year history of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (the Power Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839–839h. That statute established the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (the Council), an interstate agency composed of state-appointed representatives from Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington that Congress tasked with promulgating both "a regional conservation and electric power plan" and "a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(1), 839b(h)(1)(A).
 
    The case presents a challenge by an environmental group, the Northwest Resource Information Center (NRIC), to the Sixth Northwest Power Plan (the Plan) that the Council adopted in May 2010. NRIC's key complaint is that the Council failed to give due consideration to the accommodation of fish and wildlife interests when it adopted the Plan. The Appeals Court rules, ". . .we affirm the Plan with respect to NRIC's "due-consideration" challenge, but remand the Plan to the Council for the limited purposes of (1) allowing public notice and comment on the proposed methodology for determining quantifiable environmental costs and benefits, and (2) reconsidering the inclusion in the Plan of a market-price-based estimate of the cost of accommodating fish and wildlife interests."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Energy, #Wildlife, #CA9]

Monday, September 16, 2013

Louisiana Department Of Environmental Quality v. U.S. EPA

Sep 13: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Case No. 12-60482. A Petition for Review of an Order of the Environmental Protection Agency. In short summary, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) petitioned for judicial review of a U.S. EPA objection to three title V air permits issued by LDEQ to Nucor Steel Louisiana (Nucor). The Appeals Court dismissed the petition saying it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
 
    In some detail, the Appeals Court explains, "LDEQ and Nucor's counter-arguments fail to persuade. They first argue that, because the EPA failed to object during § 7661d(b)(2)'s 60-day window for granting or denying a petition, § 7661d(c)'s limitation on judicial review does not apply. Nucor offers no support for that interpretation of § 7661d(b)(2), other than legislative history indicating that Congress intended the title V petition process to be timely, and its argument ignores the plain language of § 7661d(b)(2). Section 7661d(b)(2) does not prohibit the EPA from issuing an objection after the 60-day window has expired, and § 7661d(c) does not distinguish between timely and late objections in defining the point at which judicial review may be sought. Nor did Congress provide a remedy for an untimely objection. In such cases, courts are not to supply loss of jurisdiction as a consequence of a late objection.26
 
    "LDEQ and Nucor next argue that the Objection is not an 'objection' within the meaning of § 7661d and therefore not subject to § 7661d(c)'s requirement that the Administrator take final action to issue or deny a permit before it can be subject to judicial review. LDEQ and Nucor point to no text supporting the distinction they attempt to draw, nor do they provide any workable rule for determining what constitutes an actual 'objection.' They essentially argue that because the Objection is improper, it is not an actual objection and is therefore subject to judicial review. But that same argument would apply in any action challenging an EPA objection. Accepting the argument would eviscerate § 7661d(c)'s limitation on judicial review of EPA objections, would require determination of the merits of the challenge to the Objection before determining jurisdiction, and is in tension with the necessity for subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of a challenge. Whatever may be the outer limits of an objection, relabeling the EPA action does not change its substance.
 
    "We hold that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the Objection, but we do not determine whether LDEQ and Nucor may pursue other avenues of judicial review, such as an action in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). We conclude that review in this forum is not proper until the Administrator takes final action issuing or denying a permit."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Air, #CA5]

Thursday, September 12, 2013

Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell

Sep 11: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-35303. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The panel dismissed an action brought by the Wild Fish Conservancy challenging the United States' diversion of water from Icicle Creek, a tributary of the Wenatchee River and the Columbia River, to the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery.
 
    The Appeals Court explains that this appeal concerns the control of water necessary to sustain native fish populations in Icicle Creek, a tributary of the Wenatchee River, which is itself a tributary of the Columbia. The Wild Fish Conservancy and Harriet S. Bullitt (collectively, the Conservancy) allege that the United States is improperly diverting water from Icicle Creek to the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery (the Hatchery) and otherwise violating Washington State law. The Appeals Court says, "We conclude that the Conservancy lacks prudential standing to bring its claim that the Hatchery operation violates the Washington water code, and that we lack jurisdiction to consider the Convervancy's other claims because they either do not challenge final agency action or rest on provisions of Washington law that are not incorporated into federal reclamation law. Therefore, on de novo review, we dismiss this action."
 
    In its summary the Appeals Court indicates, "As we have often acknowledged, '[s]almon and hydropower are the two great natural resources of the Columbia River Basin,' and ardent desires to promote one or the other have yielded a century of conflict. . . This iteration does not present the 'classic struggle between environmental and energy interests' . . .but instead a more nuanced conflict between two entities seeking to repair the damage that dams have done to the Basin's fisheries. Unlike the many cases we have decided concerning the fate of fish in the Columbia River Basin, the claims before us are not susceptible to federal judicial review. . ."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Water, #Wildlife, #Energy, #CA9]

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

9th Circuit Sides With Enviros & EPA On AZ Haze Control

Sep 9: A release from Earthjustice indicates that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a request from the State of Arizona and four utility companies to delay installing modern pollution controls on three large coal-fired power plants. The State and power companies were seeking a delay until litigation is complete concerning U.S. EPA's regional haze requirements for the Cholla, Coronado, and Apache power plants. 

    The decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denies the requested stay of EPA's requirements for the three coal plants, while at the same time sending a positive signal that EPA's decision stands on solid legal ground. The coal plants must now move forward with installing updated pollution controls that limit nitrogen oxides pollution, which causes haze, ozone, and other air pollution. Earthjustice attorney Michael Hiatt, representing National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) and Sierra Club in the litigation said, "The court's ruling prevents the state of Arizona and the utility companies' attempts to further delay installing long overdue pollution controls. Modern pollution controls at Cholla, Coronado, and Apache will result in cleaner air for Arizonans to breathe and will help restore the iconic scenic views at the Grand Canyon and other natural areas." 

    NPCA Arizona Senior Program Manager Kevin Dahl said, "Despite the promises of the 1977 Clean Air Act, 18 prized national parks have spent decades living in the shadow of the haze caused by air pollution from these plants. The cleanup plan the EPA has set in motion is rightfully sustained by this decision and once enforced will be an important turning point for those iconic places, by clearing the air and restoring the health and beauty these national parks deserve." Sandy Bahr, chapter director for the Sierra Club's Grand Canyon Chapter said, "Reducing pollution at three of our state's dirtiest coal plants is way past due. Moving forward with limiting these emissions protects both the skies of our iconic national parks and wilderness areas and our health."

    Access a release from Earthjustice (click here). [#Air, #CA9]

Thursday, September 5, 2013

Martin Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia

Sep 4: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, Case No. 12-1790. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. The Appeals Court summarized, "The plaintiffs below, Martin and Lisa Whiteman (Whitemans), appeal from a final order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia that granted summary judgment to the defendant, Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Chesapeake), upon the Whitemans' claim for common law trespass. We find no error in the district court's decision and affirm for the reasons that follow."
 
    The Whitemans own the surface rights to approximately 101 acres in Wetzel County, West Virginia, pursuant to a general warranty deed dated March 2, 1992. See JA at 93-94. Chesapeake owns lease rights to minerals beneath the Whitemans' surface property. See JA at 608. The property rights of both the Whitemans and Chesapeake ultimately flow from two severance deeds that originally split the surface and mineral estates of the 101 acres relevant here. The two severance deeds effected severance by granting the respective surface estates to grantees while "reserving and excepting" the mineral estate to the grantor.
 
    The Whitemans live on and farm their 101 acres, primarily raising sheep and, relatedly, using part of the land to produce hay for the sheep. Conversely, Chesapeake operates three natural gas wells on approximately ten acres of the Whitemans' property that was formerly used for hay production. The Whitemans can no longer produce hay on those ten acres because Chesapeake's well operations and permanent drill waste disposal on the surface have rendered that portion of the Whitemans' property unusable for any suitable purpose.
 
    For each of their gas wells located on the Whitemans' surface property, Chesapeake obtained valid well work and pit waste discharge permits from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP). As part of the permitting process, Chesapeake gave the Whitemans notice of Chesapeake's intent to drill and dispose of drill waste in on-site waste pits. Chesapeake disposed of the drill cuttings in accord with the waste disposal method listed on their well work and pit waste discharge permit applications, namely by depositing the drill cuttings into open pits located near the wellheads on the Whitemans' surface property.
 
    The Appeals  Court indicates that the drill cuttings consist of earth, rock, and other debris necessarily removed from the ground when the drill bores the well, as well as drilling mud ranging from water-based fluid mixed with minerals to oil-based fluid with a composition similar to diesel fuel to synthetic oil-based fluid with a composition similar to food-grade mineral oil.
 
    In their complaint, the Whitemans asked for an injunction and damages based on claims arising from the drilling and operation by Chesapeake of three natural gas wells on surface property owned by the Whitemans. The complaint alleged claims under West Virginia common law only, namely nuisance, trespass, negligence, strict liability, recklessness or gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
 
    The Appeals  Court concluded, ". . .the district court was correct to hold that creating drill waste pits was reasonably necessary for recovery of natural gas and did not impose a substantial burden on the Whitemans' surface property, that creation of the pits was consistent with Chesapeake's rights under its lease, was a practice common to natural gas wells in West Virginia, and consistent with requirements of applicable rules and regulations for the protection of the environment. Accordingly the decision of the district court is affirmed."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Energy/NatGas, #Agriculture, #Land, #Haz, #CA4]

Drakes Bay Oyster Company v. Jewell

Sep 3: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 13-15227. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In a split decision the panel affirmed the district court's order denying a preliminary injunction challenging the Secretary of the Interior's discretionary decision to let Drakes Bay Oyster Company's permit for commercial oyster farming at Point Reyes National Seashore expire on its own terms.
 
Drakes Bay challenges the Secretary of the Interior's discretionary decision to let Drakes Bay's permit for commercial oyster farming expire according to its terms. The permit, which allowed farming within Point Reyes National Seashore, was set to lapse in November 2012. Drakes Bay requested an extension pursuant to a Congressional enactment; however, the Secretary declined to extend the permit, and Drakes Bay sought a preliminary injunction.
 
    The majority ruled, "Congress authorized, but did not require, the Secretary to extend the permit. Congress left the decision to grant or deny an extension to the Secretary's discretion, without imposing any mandatory considerations. . . any asserted errors in the NEPA review were harmless. . . Drakes Bay's disagreement with the value judgments made by the Secretary is not a legitimate basis on which to set aside the decision. Once we determine, as we have, that the Secretary did not violate any statutory mandate, it is not our province to intercede in his discretionary decision. We, therefore, affirm the district court's order denying a preliminary injunction."
 
    The dissenting Judge said, "I think Congress, by including the 'notwithstanding' clause in § 124, intended to do more than that. In particular, it sought to override the Department of the Interior's misinterpretation of the Point Reyes Wilderness Act. . . I think Drakes Bay is likely to prevail on its claim that the Secretary's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . Because the other preliminary injunction factors also weigh in Drakes Bay's favor, injunctive relief preserving the status quo should have been granted here. . ."
 
    Access the complete opinion and dissent (click here). [#Wildlife, #Land, #Water, #CA9]