State of Wyoming v. NPCA

Feb 29: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Case No. 10-8088, 10-8089, & 10-8090. Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. As explained by the Appeals Court, in 1974, the National Park Service (NPS) adopted a default rule prohibiting the use of snowmobiles in all national parks except on designated routes. 36 C.F.R. § 2.18(c). Pursuant to the default rule, NPS must promulgate a special regulation designating specific routes open to snowmobile use in a particular national park. Absent such a rule, no snowmobiles are allowed. See id. (Snowmobiles are prohibited except where designated).

 

    NPS originally regulated designated routes, choosing not to set a limit on the number of snowmobiles permitted in the parks. 36 C.F.R. § 7.13(l)(2) (2000). In 1997, environmental and recreational groups began seeking to limit the daily number of snowmobiles permitted in Yellowstone National Park, Grand Teton National Park, and the John D. Rockefeller Jr. Memorial Parkway (collectively, the parks). And over the past fifteen years, groups have continued to litigate the fate of snowmobiles in the parks.

 

    In the present cases, Petitioners the State of Wyoming and Park County, Wyoming filed petitions for review of agency action, challenging the 2009 rules governing snowmobile use in the parks. The district court dismissed the petitions for review, holding Petitioners lacked standing to pursue their claims. On appeal, Petitioners ask us again to weigh in on this ongoing saga. The Appeals Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further review.

 

    Explaining further, the Appeals Court said, "Because we hold Petitioners' procedural challenge to the 2009 temporary rule as to Yellowstone is moot, that portion of the district court's order must be vacated and remanded to the district court to dismiss that portion of the case for lack of jurisdiction. Wyoming, 587 F.3d at 1254. As to Petitioners' remaining claims, we conclude that Petitioners lack Article III standing to bring their substantive challenge to the 2009 temporary rule as to Yellowstone and their entire challenge as to the 2009 permanent rule as to Grand Teton because Petitioners' alleged injuries are merely speculative. Accordingly, we need not address prudential standing."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Land, #CA10]

 

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U.S. v. General Electric Company

Feb 29: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Case No. 11-1034. Appealed from the U.S. District Court of New Hampshire, Concord. The Appeals Court explains that Defendant-Appellant General Electric Company (GE) appeals from a district court judgment holding it liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA for response costs incurred by U.S. EPA in the unfinished cleanup of the Fletcher's Paint Works and Storage Facility Superfund Site in Milford, New Hampshire (Fletcher Site). GE also appeals the district court's judgment awarding the United States certain costs incurred in connection with the Fletcher Site's cleanup. The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the district court on both issues.

 

    The Appeals Court explained further, "We hold that the instant suit is a subsequent action under CERCLA and that the 1991 Action was an initial action as per § 9613(g)(2). GE does not claim -- nor do we believe it reasonably could -- that the 1991 Action was not an 'action for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607 . . . .' 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2). Although the United States asserted a claim for declaratory judgment regarding GE's liability in the 1991 Action, the parties concluded that resolving the matter via consent decree was to their mutual benefit. The United States and GE both walked away from the 1991 Action knowing they would likely meet again; GE did not concede liability and the United States reserved its right to pursue additional recovery costs at a later date. This agreement was reached according to routine CERCLA practice and was consistent with the United States' obligation to avoid drawn-out litigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) ('[W]henever practicable and in the public interest . . . the President shall act to facilitate agreements . . . to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation.' (emphasis added by Appeals Court)). GE's claims to the contrary are unavailing."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Remed, #CA1]

 

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Sierra Club v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Feb 29: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-17891. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. In a brief unpublished Memorandum the Appeals Court indicates that defendant-appellant Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees League to Save Lake Tahoe and Sierra Club, vacating TRPA's adoption of amendments to its regulation of the shorezone region of Lake Tahoe (the Shorezone Amendments). The Appeals Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further review.

 

    The Appeals Court states, "As TRPA concedes, the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Shorezone Amendments failed to explain and evaluate the impact of replacing unauthorized boat buoys currently on Lake Tahoe with permitted buoys on a one for-one basis. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that TRPA compared the impact of the proposed project to an environmental baseline that included those existing, unauthorized buoys. We agree with the district court that 'in light of [these] concerns and TRPA's failure to identify any discussion in the EIS of why this baseline was chosen, the baseline is arbitrary and capricious in light of TRPA's failure to consider an important aspect of the problem and to articulate a rational connection between the facts found and conclusions reached.'

 

    "However, we vacate the district court's alternative holding that TRPA's 'use of the number of existing buoys, rather than the number of existing buoys authorized by TRPA, as the baseline, was contrary to the [Tahoe Regional Planning] Compact and therefore arbitrary and capricious.' Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the only way for TRPA to satisfy its obligations under the Compact would be to exclude unauthorized, existing buoys from the baseline. TRPA shall retain discretion on remand to determine the best way to explain and evaluate the impact of the proposed project and its choice of an appropriate baseline. Costs on appeal are awarded to TRPA."

 

    Access the complete Memorandum (click here). [#Water, #Land, #CA9]

 

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