Thursday, June 30, 2011
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
In further explanation, the Appeals Court says, "the statute and its applicability could not be more clear. Roth seeks to impose a tank car design requirement. Section 5125(b)(1) expressly preempts any common law requirement 'about' the design of a 'package, container, or packaging component . . . qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce.' Roth concedes that Norfalco's tank cars are containers qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce. Thus, the HMTA plainly encompasses Roth's common law claims. It is irrelevant what Roth was doing at the precise moment of his injury. This only makes sense, for it cannot be the case that the comprehensive design requirements erected by the HMTA cease to govern simply because the tank car was emptied of its contents days after its delivery. The tank car is, at all times, a container qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials. The proposed design requirement is expressly preempted."
Monday, June 27, 2011
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Evans Industries, Inc., (Evans) operated a series of five leased facilities in Louisiana and Texas that manufactured, filled, warehoused and distributed steel drums and industrial containers. Evans filed a Chapter 11 petition in April 2006, and the bankruptcy court confirmed the reorganization plan in October 2006. The plan formed a Distribution Trust of Evans Industries (the Trust) and allocated most of Evans's assets to that Trust. R. Patrick Sharp, III was appointed Trustee. In November 2006, on the plan's closing date, Greif Industrial Packaging (Greif) entered into an asset purchase agreement (APA) with Evans.
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Monday, June 20, 2011
"Notwithstanding these disabilities, the plaintiffs propose that individual federal judges determine, in the first instance, what amount of carbon-dioxide emissions is 'unreasonable,' App. 103, 145, and then decide what level of reduction is 'practical, feasible and economically viable,' App. 58, 119. These determinations would be made for the defendants named in the two lawsuits launched by the plaintiffs. Similar suits could be mounted, counsel for the States and New York City estimated, against 'thousands or hundreds or tens' of other defendants fitting the description 'large contributors' to carbon-dioxide emissions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57.
"The judgments the plaintiffs would commit to federal judges, in suits that could be filed in any federal district, cannot be reconciled with the decisionmaking scheme Congress enacted. The Second Circuit erred, we hold, in ruling that federal judges may set limits on greenhouse gas emissions in face of a law empowering EPA to set the same limits, subject to judicial review only to ensure against action 'arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.' §7607(d)(9)."