The Plaintiffs alleged that the Blending Statute, enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly in 2008, was preempted by (1) the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841; (2) the Federal renewable fuel program; and (3) the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1113. Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in concluding that the Blending Statute was not preempted on the basis of the Lanham Act, the PMPA, or the federal renewable fuel program. Defendants' argue, as a threshold matter, that there is no preemption because suppliers can opt out of the requirements of the Blending Statute.
The Appeals Court notes that, one of the Lanham Act's purposes is "to establish uniform regulation of trademarks thereby eliminating the possibility that remedies would vary from state to state." Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 457 (11th Cir. 1984). The Lanham Act is intended to, inter alia, "protect registered marks used in [interstate] commerce from interference by State . . . legislation."