May 13: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Case No. 08-5154. The case, involving dozens of attorneys, is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction issued by an Oklahoma district court in September 2008. The motion arose out of a 2005 complaint filed by Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively referred to as Oklahoma) against Defendants-Appellees (collectively referred to as Tyson Foods), which alleged various State and Federal environmental claims.
Pursuant to that complaint, on November 14, 2007, Oklahoma filed its motion for a preliminary injunction under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), seeking to enjoin Tyson Foods from “(1) applying poultry waste to any land within the [Illinois River Watershed (IRW)] and (2) allowing the application of poultry waste generated at its respective poultry feeding operations and/or the respective poultry feeding operations under contract with it to any land within the IRW.” The district court denied the preliminary injunction on September 29, 2008, and the Appeals Court affirmed the denial.
The majority Appeals Court, in this partially split decision (dissent in part, concur in part), said in conclusion, "In its opinion and order denying a preliminary injunction, the district court stated that 'the State has not yet met its burden of proving that bacteria in the waters of the IRW are caused by the application of poultry litter rather than by other sources . . . . As a result, the State has failed to meet the heightened standard for a preliminary injunction . . . .'
"The district court set out the standard for granting a preliminary injunction, determined that the requested injunction required a heightened showing of the four factors, and then indicated that it did not find Oklahoma’s two expert witnesses on the source of bacterial pollutants in the IRW to be sufficiently credible. . . Therefore, the court held, Oklahoma could not establish causation, and thus by implication Oklahoma could not establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its RCRA claim.
"We certainly agree that the district court’s order could have been more explicit, but the grounds for the district court’s decision are sufficiently apparent to allow us to conduct appellate review, namely, it allows us to determine (1) the legal standards employed, (2) whether the findings have sufficient evidentiary support, (3) whether the legal conclusions follow from those findings, and (4) whether the legal conclusions support the grant or denial of relief. Thus, even if this court did find that the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the error would be harmless and a remand for clarification would not be necessary because we can ascertain from the record the basis for the denial. . . The district court, based on the evidence presented, simply could not establish a sufficient link between land-applied poultry litter and bacteria in the IRW, and therefore preliminary injunctive relief was not appropriate."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Daisy Abdur-Rahman v. John Walker
May 11: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 08-12345. The appeal presents the question whether reports by compliance inspectors of a water and sewer department that “owe[ their] existence” to investigative duties assigned to the inspectors are protected by the First Amendment from managerial discipline. The Appeals Court cites Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
Daisy Abdur-Rahman and Ryan Petty, inspectors formerly employed by the Department of Public Works of DeKalb County, Georgia, appeal a judgment on the pleadings against their complaint and in favor of their former supervisors, John Walker and Chester Gudewicz Jr. The inspectors complained that their employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting to their supervisors about the compliance of the county with the Clean Water Act, in violation of rights secured by the whistleblower provision of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1367(a), and the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The inspectors’ reports to their supervisors were based on investigations of sewer overflows the inspectors performed as part of their assigned duties.
The district court concluded that section 1983 does not provide a private right of action for violations of the Clean Water Act and the job-related reports of the inspectors were not citizen speech protected by the First Amendment. In a split, 2-1 opinion, the Appeals Court affirmed the district court decision.
The majority explained further, "At every turn, the argument of the inspectors is incompatible with the precedents of our Court and the Supreme Court that limit the claims of government employees under the First Amendment to citizen speech on matters of public concern. To remain faithful to these precedents, we must review the whole record, and we cannot focus exclusively on whether the inspectors were required to speak. We cannot separate the statements the inspectors made from the official responsibilities to which those expressions were related. We affirm the judgment that the inspectors’ complaint under the First Amendment fails as a matter of law."
The dissent indicated, "I dissent, believing that the majority has misapplied First Amendment principles to the facts of this case. . . the sacrifice of First Amendment rights by public employees in the interest of managerial efficiency is the exception, not the rule. To that end, the Supreme Court has ensured the broadest possible First Amendment protection for public employees by, among other things, holding specifically that the government’s managerial interests do not necessarily outweigh the rights of the employee to speak on a matter of public concern simply because the speech relates to his or her employment, nor, for that matter, because he speaks to his co-workers or supervisors rather than to the public. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-21 (2006)."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Daisy Abdur-Rahman and Ryan Petty, inspectors formerly employed by the Department of Public Works of DeKalb County, Georgia, appeal a judgment on the pleadings against their complaint and in favor of their former supervisors, John Walker and Chester Gudewicz Jr. The inspectors complained that their employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting to their supervisors about the compliance of the county with the Clean Water Act, in violation of rights secured by the whistleblower provision of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1367(a), and the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The inspectors’ reports to their supervisors were based on investigations of sewer overflows the inspectors performed as part of their assigned duties.
The district court concluded that section 1983 does not provide a private right of action for violations of the Clean Water Act and the job-related reports of the inspectors were not citizen speech protected by the First Amendment. In a split, 2-1 opinion, the Appeals Court affirmed the district court decision.
The majority explained further, "At every turn, the argument of the inspectors is incompatible with the precedents of our Court and the Supreme Court that limit the claims of government employees under the First Amendment to citizen speech on matters of public concern. To remain faithful to these precedents, we must review the whole record, and we cannot focus exclusively on whether the inspectors were required to speak. We cannot separate the statements the inspectors made from the official responsibilities to which those expressions were related. We affirm the judgment that the inspectors’ complaint under the First Amendment fails as a matter of law."
The dissent indicated, "I dissent, believing that the majority has misapplied First Amendment principles to the facts of this case. . . the sacrifice of First Amendment rights by public employees in the interest of managerial efficiency is the exception, not the rule. To that end, the Supreme Court has ensured the broadest possible First Amendment protection for public employees by, among other things, holding specifically that the government’s managerial interests do not necessarily outweigh the rights of the employee to speak on a matter of public concern simply because the speech relates to his or her employment, nor, for that matter, because he speaks to his co-workers or supervisors rather than to the public. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-21 (2006)."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. USA
May 5: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 08-10799. The case involves what the Appeals Court says is one of the Corps of Engineers "unplanned environmental consequences” of its efforts to control the “river of grass” or the Everglades, of South Florida that flowed south from Lake Okeechobee to the Florida Bay. More specifically, the case involves the Cape Sable seaside sparrow (the sparrow) that lives primarily in and around Everglades National Park. It was listed as endangered in 1967 and received critical habitat designation in 1977. The fragility of the sparrow as a species stems from two of its attributes. It has a short lifespan and its nesting success depends on specific kinds of vegetation and water levels.
One of the sparrows subpopulations has decreased from more than 2,600 birds in 1992 to 112 birds in 2006. The Corps’ method of releasing water into the Everglades has been blamed for that decline. Also, at risk is the Everglade Snail Kite, a type of hawk, that was also listed as endangered in 1967 and received critical habitat designation in 1977. During a period of regional drought, Florida’s total kite population declined from 3,400 birds in 1999 to 1,700 in 2002, but it appears to have stabilized since then. The problem, of managing the two habitats is that the kites prefer steady and moderate to low water levels above one of the control gates (S-12), while the sparrows prefer low water below the S-12 gates.
The Corps and the Fish & Wildlife Service, consult with each other on habitat management and when a proposed agency action may adversely affect an endangered species or its critical habitat, the Service creates a “biological opinion” determining whether the action would jeopardize the species. Following the development of Corps plans and biological opinions the Miccosukee Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Fish & Wildlife Service, challenging the Interim Plan.
The Court of Appeals ruled that, "We do uphold the Fish & Wildlife Service’s conclusion that the kite will not be jeopardized by its sparrow-saving Interim Plan. The law, however, requires more. It requires that the incidental take statement contain an adequate trigger for re-consultation, and that a trigger must be expressed in population terms unless it is impractical to do so. Because those requirements are not met, the current incidental take statement must be modified or replaced. We vacate the district court’s judgment to the extent that it upholds the incidental take statement, but we affirm the judgment in all other respects, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
One of the sparrows subpopulations has decreased from more than 2,600 birds in 1992 to 112 birds in 2006. The Corps’ method of releasing water into the Everglades has been blamed for that decline. Also, at risk is the Everglade Snail Kite, a type of hawk, that was also listed as endangered in 1967 and received critical habitat designation in 1977. During a period of regional drought, Florida’s total kite population declined from 3,400 birds in 1999 to 1,700 in 2002, but it appears to have stabilized since then. The problem, of managing the two habitats is that the kites prefer steady and moderate to low water levels above one of the control gates (S-12), while the sparrows prefer low water below the S-12 gates.
The Corps and the Fish & Wildlife Service, consult with each other on habitat management and when a proposed agency action may adversely affect an endangered species or its critical habitat, the Service creates a “biological opinion” determining whether the action would jeopardize the species. Following the development of Corps plans and biological opinions the Miccosukee Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Fish & Wildlife Service, challenging the Interim Plan.
The Court of Appeals ruled that, "We do uphold the Fish & Wildlife Service’s conclusion that the kite will not be jeopardized by its sparrow-saving Interim Plan. The law, however, requires more. It requires that the incidental take statement contain an adequate trigger for re-consultation, and that a trigger must be expressed in population terms unless it is impractical to do so. Because those requirements are not met, the current incidental take statement must be modified or replaced. We vacate the district court’s judgment to the extent that it upholds the incidental take statement, but we affirm the judgment in all other respects, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
High Court Rules 8-1 On Superfund Liability Issues
May 4: The U.S. Supreme Court decided the consolidated cases of Burlington No., & Santa Fe R. Co., v. United States, (Docket No. 07-1601); and Shell Oil Co., v. United States (Docket No. 07-1607) on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit [See WIMS 2/25/089]. The 8-1 opinion was delivered by Justice Stevens and supported by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer and Alito. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion. In these cases involving cleanups under the Comprehensive, Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the High Court explained that the cases "raise the questions whether and to what extent a party associated with a contaminated site may be held responsible for the full costs of remediation."
The law allows the government to obtain reimbursement for the costs of remediating hazardous waste sites from the owners and operators of land on which a disposal of hazardous substances has occurred. However, because even passive landowners may be subjected to CERCLA liability, Congress removed language from early CERCLA bills mandating joint and several liability for multiple defendants who own or operate a particular site. In the Burlington case, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless imposed joint and several liability for the entire cost of a facility's remediation on two landlords, even though they owned only a portion of the overall site for a fraction of its period of operation. In the Shell Oil case, the questions presented are whether liability for "arranging" for disposal of hazardous substances under CERCLA may be imposed upon a manufacturer who merely sells and ships, by common carrier, a commercially useful product, transferring ownership and control to a purchaser who then causes contamination involving that product.
In the Ninth Circuit, the final opinion concluded, "The district court erred in determining that the harm in this case could be apportioned on this record. Given the district court’s erroneous approach and the paucity of record evidence, there is no reasonable basis for apportioning the damages attributable to the Railroads’ activity. Shell’s liability is a closer call, but the evidence on the record in that regard is also insufficient to support apportionment. The district court followed the proper analysis in finding that Shell is liable as an arranger. Shell arranged for the sale and transfer of chemicals under circumstances in which a known, inherent part of that transfer was the leakage, and so the disposal, of those chemicals."
The Supreme Court concluded, "that the Court of Appeals erred by holding Shell liable as an arranger under CERCLA for the costs of remediating environmental contamination at the Arvin, California facility. Furthermore, we conclude that the District Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs at 9%. The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg said, "Although the question is close, I would uphold the determinations of the courts below that Shell qualifies as an arranger within the compass of the. . . CERCLA."
Access the complete 23-page majority opinion and dissent (click here). Access the transcript of the oral arguments (click here). Access the Supreme Court docket for 07-1601 (click here). Access the Supreme Court docket for 07-1607 (click here). Access the various merit and amicus briefs filed by the parties (click here, scroll down to February 24). Access more information on the SCOTUS Wiki (click here). Access links to various media reports on the case (click here).
The law allows the government to obtain reimbursement for the costs of remediating hazardous waste sites from the owners and operators of land on which a disposal of hazardous substances has occurred. However, because even passive landowners may be subjected to CERCLA liability, Congress removed language from early CERCLA bills mandating joint and several liability for multiple defendants who own or operate a particular site. In the Burlington case, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless imposed joint and several liability for the entire cost of a facility's remediation on two landlords, even though they owned only a portion of the overall site for a fraction of its period of operation. In the Shell Oil case, the questions presented are whether liability for "arranging" for disposal of hazardous substances under CERCLA may be imposed upon a manufacturer who merely sells and ships, by common carrier, a commercially useful product, transferring ownership and control to a purchaser who then causes contamination involving that product.
In the Ninth Circuit, the final opinion concluded, "The district court erred in determining that the harm in this case could be apportioned on this record. Given the district court’s erroneous approach and the paucity of record evidence, there is no reasonable basis for apportioning the damages attributable to the Railroads’ activity. Shell’s liability is a closer call, but the evidence on the record in that regard is also insufficient to support apportionment. The district court followed the proper analysis in finding that Shell is liable as an arranger. Shell arranged for the sale and transfer of chemicals under circumstances in which a known, inherent part of that transfer was the leakage, and so the disposal, of those chemicals."
The Supreme Court concluded, "that the Court of Appeals erred by holding Shell liable as an arranger under CERCLA for the costs of remediating environmental contamination at the Arvin, California facility. Furthermore, we conclude that the District Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs at 9%. The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg said, "Although the question is close, I would uphold the determinations of the courts below that Shell qualifies as an arranger within the compass of the. . . CERCLA."
Access the complete 23-page majority opinion and dissent (click here). Access the transcript of the oral arguments (click here). Access the Supreme Court docket for 07-1601 (click here). Access the Supreme Court docket for 07-1607 (click here). Access the various merit and amicus briefs filed by the parties (click here, scroll down to February 24). Access more information on the SCOTUS Wiki (click here). Access links to various media reports on the case (click here).
Monday, May 4, 2009
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. FAA
May 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Case No. 06-5267. The Panama City-Bay County Airport and Industrial District (the sponsor), a state-chartered entity that owns and operates Panama City-Bay County International Airport proposed to close the existing airport at Panama City FL and to construct a new airport in western Bay County (the West Bay Site). Pursuant to the Airport and Airway Improvement Act (AAIA), the Sponsor sought and obtained approval for the construction project from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Petitioners Natural Resources Defense Council et al (NRDC) challenged the FAA's decision as a violation of the AAIA and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and requested that the court enjoin the FAA from implementing its decision. The Appeals Court concluded that, "Because the FAA's decision is not 'arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' we deny the petition for review and the relief sought therein."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Petitioners Natural Resources Defense Council et al (NRDC) challenged the FAA's decision as a violation of the AAIA and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and requested that the court enjoin the FAA from implementing its decision. The Appeals Court concluded that, "Because the FAA's decision is not 'arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' we deny the petition for review and the relief sought therein."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Thursday, April 30, 2009
White Tanks Concerned Citizens v. Strock (Corps of Engineers)
Apr 29: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 07-15659. According to the Appeals Court explanation, this environmental dispute is between developers who dream of building thousands of homes in the now relatively undisturbed desert near the White Tank Mountains west of Phoenix, Arizona, and a non-profit organization formed essentially to oppose such developments. The focus of the dispute is the adequacy of the study that went into the decision by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to grant a permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) so that the developers could fill several "ephemeral washes" that run through the project area.
The Appeals Court said, "The scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is not entirely clear after the Supreme Court’s four-four-one decision in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), but there has never been any direct challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction before the Corps in this case, and the existence of the Corps’ jurisdiction is not disputed before this court."
Rather, the Appeals Court said, the dispute is over which of the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions should control. In summary, the case focuses on the question of whether it is factually more similar to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Save Our Sonoran v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (SOS), or the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (Wetlands).
In SOS, the Ninth Circuit held that before the Corps could grant a permit to fill washes similar in nature to those at issue in the appeal, the Corps must consider the entire scope of that development, because the pattern of washes in the area made any development avoiding the washes impossible. In Wetlands, the Ninth Circuit considered a project that required filling natural saltwater wetlands, but in mitigation created a larger freshwater wetland. The Appeals Court held that the Corps properly confined its environmental review to the wetlands and was not required to study the environmental effects on the upland area, principally because the development of the upland area could proceed independent of the wetlands project.
According to the Appeals Court, the district court in the current case, delivered "a thoughtful opinion," concluding that it should follow Wetlands because it agreed with the analysis of the Corps in the district court that the bulk of the project could be developed independently, without affecting the area traversed by the washes.
The Appeals Court concludes, "Upon a close review of the district court and administrative records, including the permit application itself and concerns that the U.S. EPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) raised before the Corps, we conclude that the washes here were, in most material respects, more like the washes in SOS than those in Wetlands. These washes were dispersed throughout the project area in such a way that, as a practical matter, no large-scale development could take place without filling the washes. We therefore hold that the Corps’ Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) was made on the basis of too narrow a scope of analysis, and we reverse the district court." Further, the case is remanded "for entry of an appropriate injunction against the issuance of a Section 404 permit until the Corps performs the requisite environmental analysis in accordance with this opinion."
Access the compete opinion (click here).
The Appeals Court said, "The scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is not entirely clear after the Supreme Court’s four-four-one decision in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), but there has never been any direct challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction before the Corps in this case, and the existence of the Corps’ jurisdiction is not disputed before this court."
Rather, the Appeals Court said, the dispute is over which of the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions should control. In summary, the case focuses on the question of whether it is factually more similar to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Save Our Sonoran v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (SOS), or the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (Wetlands).
In SOS, the Ninth Circuit held that before the Corps could grant a permit to fill washes similar in nature to those at issue in the appeal, the Corps must consider the entire scope of that development, because the pattern of washes in the area made any development avoiding the washes impossible. In Wetlands, the Ninth Circuit considered a project that required filling natural saltwater wetlands, but in mitigation created a larger freshwater wetland. The Appeals Court held that the Corps properly confined its environmental review to the wetlands and was not required to study the environmental effects on the upland area, principally because the development of the upland area could proceed independent of the wetlands project.
According to the Appeals Court, the district court in the current case, delivered "a thoughtful opinion," concluding that it should follow Wetlands because it agreed with the analysis of the Corps in the district court that the bulk of the project could be developed independently, without affecting the area traversed by the washes.
The Appeals Court concludes, "Upon a close review of the district court and administrative records, including the permit application itself and concerns that the U.S. EPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) raised before the Corps, we conclude that the washes here were, in most material respects, more like the washes in SOS than those in Wetlands. These washes were dispersed throughout the project area in such a way that, as a practical matter, no large-scale development could take place without filling the washes. We therefore hold that the Corps’ Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) was made on the basis of too narrow a scope of analysis, and we reverse the district court." Further, the case is remanded "for entry of an appropriate injunction against the issuance of a Section 404 permit until the Corps performs the requisite environmental analysis in accordance with this opinion."
Access the compete opinion (click here).
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
State of New Mexico v. Bureau of Land Management
Apr 28: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Case No.06-2352. As explained by the Appeals Court, the litigation concerns the environmental fate of New Mexico’s Otero Mesa, the largest publicly-owned expanse of undisturbed Chihuahuan Desert grassland in the United States (over 1.2 million acres). From 1998 to 2004, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM or the Agency) conducted a large-scale land management planning process for federal fluid minerals development in Sierra and Otero Counties, where the Mesa is located. Ultimately, the Agency opened the majority of the Mesa to development, subject to a stipulation that only 5% of the surface of the Mesa could be in use at any one time.
Invoking the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Federal Land Management Policy Act (FLPMA), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the State of New Mexico and a coalition of environmental organizations led by the New Mexico Wilderness Association (NMWA) challenged in federal district court the procedures by which BLM reached this determination. NMWA also challenged BLM’s decision not to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) regarding possible impacts of the planned development on the Northern Aplomado Falcon.
The district court rejected the challenges, save for the plaintiffs’ argument that BLM erred in beginning the leasing process on the Mesa before conducting additional analysis of site-specific environmental impacts flowing from the issuance of development leases. The Appeals Court ruled, "Discerning serious flaws in BLM’s procedures, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that NEPA requires BLM to conduct site-specific analysis before the leasing stage but reverse its determination that BLM’s plan-level analysis complied with NEPA. Moreover, we affirm its conclusion that BLM complied with public comment provisions in FLPMA, and we vacate as moot the portion of the district court’s order addressing NMWA’s ESA claims."
New Mexico Attorney General Gary King commented on the decision and said, "This is great news for those who believe as I do that the preservation of Otero Mesa is critical to the health of people, wildlife and the environment In southeastern New Mexico. This decision confirms the position of the Attorney General's office that the Otero Mesa development plan did not properly take into consideration all the environmental impacts to the habitat and protection of groundwater in the area so this is a huge victory for us." The AG indicated in a release that the 10th Circuit reversed Judge Bruce Black on most issues concerning the propriety of issuing oil and gas leases on Otero Mesa. The Bureau of Land Management will likely have to complete an environmental impact statement on the entire Otero Mesa management plan; at least consider totally closing Otero Mesa to development; show more evidence for conclusions about impacts on the area's aquifer and; conduct further analysis before leasing.
Access the complete opinion (click here). Access the statement from the NM AG (click here). Access the New Mexico Wilderness Association website for more information (click here).
Invoking the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Federal Land Management Policy Act (FLPMA), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the State of New Mexico and a coalition of environmental organizations led by the New Mexico Wilderness Association (NMWA) challenged in federal district court the procedures by which BLM reached this determination. NMWA also challenged BLM’s decision not to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) regarding possible impacts of the planned development on the Northern Aplomado Falcon.
The district court rejected the challenges, save for the plaintiffs’ argument that BLM erred in beginning the leasing process on the Mesa before conducting additional analysis of site-specific environmental impacts flowing from the issuance of development leases. The Appeals Court ruled, "Discerning serious flaws in BLM’s procedures, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that NEPA requires BLM to conduct site-specific analysis before the leasing stage but reverse its determination that BLM’s plan-level analysis complied with NEPA. Moreover, we affirm its conclusion that BLM complied with public comment provisions in FLPMA, and we vacate as moot the portion of the district court’s order addressing NMWA’s ESA claims."
New Mexico Attorney General Gary King commented on the decision and said, "This is great news for those who believe as I do that the preservation of Otero Mesa is critical to the health of people, wildlife and the environment In southeastern New Mexico. This decision confirms the position of the Attorney General's office that the Otero Mesa development plan did not properly take into consideration all the environmental impacts to the habitat and protection of groundwater in the area so this is a huge victory for us." The AG indicated in a release that the 10th Circuit reversed Judge Bruce Black on most issues concerning the propriety of issuing oil and gas leases on Otero Mesa. The Bureau of Land Management will likely have to complete an environmental impact statement on the entire Otero Mesa management plan; at least consider totally closing Otero Mesa to development; show more evidence for conclusions about impacts on the area's aquifer and; conduct further analysis before leasing.
Access the complete opinion (click here). Access the statement from the NM AG (click here). Access the New Mexico Wilderness Association website for more information (click here).
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