Tuesday, March 5, 2013

In Re: Deepwater Horizon

Mar 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Case No. 12-30230 and 12-30230. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
 
    The Appeals Court explains that, "This appeal presents only one of the many disputes that have arisen and will arise from the explosion and sinking of Transocean's Deepwater Horizon in April 2010. Today we address the obligations of Transocean's primary and excess-liability insurers to cover BP's pollution-related liabilities deriving from the ensuing oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Applying Texas law, especially as clarified since the district court's decision, we find that the umbrella insurance policy -- not the indemnity provisions of Transocean's and BP's contract -- controls the extent to which BP is covered for its operations under the Drilling Contract. Because we find this policy imposes no relevant limitations upon the extent to which BP is covered, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for entry of an appropriate judgment in accordance with this opinion. . .
 
    "Accordingly, we conclude: Because we find the umbrella policies between the Insurers and Transocean do not impose any relevant limitation upon the extent to which BP is an additional insured, and because the additional insured provision in the Drilling Contract is separate from and additional to the indemnity provisions therein, we find BP is entitled to coverage under each of
Transocean's policies as an additional insured as a matter of law. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to enter the appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Energy/OilSpill, #Remed, #CA5]
 
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Great Old Broads For Wilderness v. Kimbell

Mar 4: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 11-16183. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The panel reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's judgment in favor of the United States Forest Service in an action challenging the Forest Service's approval of the restoration of a flood-damaged road in the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada.
 
    The Appeals court explains that this case arises out of the long and contentious process to repair a flood-damaged road in a sensitive area of the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest in Elko County, Nevada. They said, "A related dispute reached us twice before, when we ordered that Appellants Great Old Broads and the Wilderness Society (collectively, Great Old Broads) be allowed to intervene in court-directed settlement talks to determine how best to repair or replace the road, rejecting timeliness and standing challenges. . . Great Old Broads now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) on Great Old Broads's claims related to the Forest Service's record of decision (ROD) determining the method for restoring the South Canyon Road as a part of the Jarbidge Canyon Project (the Project)."
 
    "The  Project was an effort to reestablish the South Canyon Road after flood waters damaged the road in 1995, eliminating vehicle access to the Snowslide Gulch Wilderness Portal in the Jarbidge Wilderness. Great Old Broads sought review in federal court, contending that the Forest Service's approval of the Project violated: (1) the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). because the Project offended the Fisheries and Wildlife Restoration standard FW-2 of the Inland Native Fish Strategy (INFISH), which is incorporated into the Humboldt National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (Humboldt Plan); (2) Executive Order 11988, (EO 11988); and (3) the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
 
    The district court gave summary judgment to the Forest Service, holding that Great Old Broads did not exhaust its administrative remedies and, alternatively, that Great Old Broads's claims failed on the merits. The Appeals Court ruled, "We reverse the district court's conclusion on exhaustion and affirm its alternate decision on the merits." And, in conclusion, "We hold that Great Old Broads exhausted its claims before the Forest Service but that the ROD conforms to the NFMA, EO 11988, and NEPA. We reverse the district court on its analysis of exhaustion, but we affirm the district court on its alternate decision on the merits as to each of the claims presented."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Land, #CA9]
 
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Monday, March 4, 2013

San Luis Unit Food Producers v. U.S.

Mar 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 11-16122. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. In this case the Appeals Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Reclamation in an action brought by farmers under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking to compel the Bureau to provide irrigation districts with more water.
 
    The Appeals Court indicates that they are considering whether farmers and farming entities (collectively, Farmers) that irrigate their land using water from the San Luis Unit of the Central Valley Project -- the nation's largest reclamation project -- may maintain a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to compel the United States Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau) to provide the Farmers' irrigation districts with more water than it is currently providing. The Farmers argue that several federal statutes require the Bureau to provide irrigators with sufficient irrigation water to satisfy the Farmers' needs before delivering water to any other party for any other purpose.
 
    The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau on several grounds, including that the Bureau does not have a statutory duty to release a certain amount of water for irrigation and that, consequently, the Farmers' claims did not satisfy the final agency action requirement of the APA. Although the district court discussed this issue in terms of sovereign immunity, the Appeals Court resolved the case slightly differently.
 
    The Appeals Court said, "Pursuant to the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004), we hold that the Bureau is not legally required to take a discrete action to deliver the Farmers'
preferred amount of San Luis Unit water for irrigation before it provides water for other purposes. The Bureau retains the discretion to allocate San Luis water among various parties to satisfy its various obligations. There is no final agency action, nor is there any action that the Bureau has unlawfully withheld. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704 & 706(1). The Farmers' claims amount to a broad programmatic attack on the way the Bureau generally operates the Central Valley Project [CVP], see SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64, and therefore the Farmers have not established subject matter jurisdiction under the APA, Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2007)."
 
    In conclusion, the Appeals Court said, "In the end, the Farmers' claims boil down to a broad, programmatic challenge to the Bureau's operation and management of the CVP and, as such, are not cognizable under the APA. Although the Farmers contend that the CVP is designed to promote irrigation over the protection of fish and wildlife, Congress decided otherwise. The Bureau is
tasked with 'operat[ing] the Central Valley Project to meet all obligations under State and Federal law, including but not limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act.' CVPIA § 3406(b) (emphasis added). That is a mandatory goal. The decision of how to achieve it, however, is the Bureau's. None of the statutes identified by the Farmers require that the Bureau deliver the Farmers' preferred amount of water to its irrigation contractors. For this reason, the Farmers' APA claims fail for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Water, #Wildlife, #CA9]
 
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Friday, March 1, 2013

In Re: Polar Bear Endangered Species

Mar 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C.Circuit, Case No. 11-5219, consolidated with 11-5221, 11-5222, 11-5223. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In this case the Appeals Court upheld a 2008 decision to protect polar bears throughout their range as a "threatened" species under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. The court dismissed challenges by the State of Alaska, polar bear trophy hunters and others seeking to strip the polar bear of its protection.
 
    The Appeals Court explains that in 2005, the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) petitioned the Secretary of the Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or agency) to list the polar bear under the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act). When a species such as the polar bear is listed as either "threatened" or "endangered" under the Act, it is then subject to a host of protective measures designed to conserve the species. After a three-year rulemaking process, FWS found that, due to the effects of global climate change, the polar bear is likely to become an endangered species and face the threat of extinction within the foreseeable future. See generally Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range ("Listing Rule"), 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008). The agency thus concluded that the polar bear should be listed as a threatened species. Id.
 
    A number of industry groups, environmental organizations, and states challenged the Listing Rule as either overly restrictive or insufficiently protective of the polar bear. These challenges were consolidated as a Multidistrict Litigation case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. After a hearing on the parties' submissions, the District Court granted summary judgment to FWS and rejected all challenges to the Listing Rule. Joint Appellants filed a timely appeal to contest the District Court's judgment. They contend that the Listing Rule is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and that FWS's action should be reversed because of a series of deficiencies in the rulemaking process and the Listing Rule itself.
 
    The Appeals Court said, "The appellate court's task in a case such as this is a 'narrow' one. Our principal responsibility here is to determine, in light of the record considered by the agency, whether the Listing Rule is a product of reasoned decisionmaking. It is significant that Appellants have neither pointed to mistakes in the agency's reasoning nor adduced any data or studies that the agency overlooked. In addition, Appellants challenge neither the agency's findings on climate science nor on polar bear biology. Rather, the principal claim advanced by Appellants is that FWS misinterpreted and misapplied the record before it. We disagree."
 
    The Appeals Court also said, "In rejecting this appeal, we are guided by the Supreme Court's admonition that 'a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,' . . .particularly in cases where the issues 'require[] a high level of technical expertise,' Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989). Given these considerations and the evident thoroughness and care of FWS's explanation for its decision, we can only conclude, as did the District Court, that Appellants' challenges 'amount to nothing more than competing views about policy and science.' In re Polar Bear, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 69. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. . . In sum, we hold that FWS plainly satisfied its duties under Section 4(i) in responding to the State of Alaska. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court on this point."
 
    Kassie Siegel, CBD director of the Climate Law Institute said, "Today's decision is the latest legal confirmation of the indisputable science on climate change and the very real threats that polar bears face. If we're going to save polar bears, the Obama administration needs to move swiftly to cut greenhouse pollution." Rebecca Riley, attorney in NRDC's land and wildlife program said, "This ruling forces Alaska to acknowledge what has been painfully clear to everyone else: polar bears are on a collision course with climate change and deserve protection. Now, we need to get serious about tackling climate change and other threats to the species like hunting and toxic contamination." John Hocevar, Greenpeace Oceans Campaign Director said, "Today's court's decision acknowledges the devastating impact of global warming on polar bears, and ensures that important legal protections for the species will be continued."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). Access a release from CBD (click here). [#Wildlife, #Climate, #CADC]
 
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Thursday, February 28, 2013

Casitas Municipal Water District v. U.S.

Feb 27: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, Case No. 2012-5033. Appealed from the United States Court of Federal Claims. In this case a local government alleges that the Federal government has imposed regulations that constitute a legal takings claim with out just compensation.

    Casitas Municipal Water District (Casitas) operates the Ventura River Project (the Project). The Project, which is owned by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), provides water to residential, industrial, and agricultural customers in Ventura County, California. Ventura County is located on the southern coast of California, approximately sixty miles northwest of Los Angeles.

    On January 26, 2005, Casitas brought suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that, by imposing certain operating criteria on the Project, the United States had taken its property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. On December 5, 2011, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Casitas's complaint without prejudice, on the ground that Casitas's takings claim was not ripe.
 
    In dismissing the complaint, the court held that Casitas's claim was not ripe because Casitas had failed to demonstrate that the operating criteria had as yet caused it to deliver less water to its customers than it otherwise would have delivered. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443 (2011) (Casitas V). Casitas now appeals the dismissal of its complaint. The Appeals Court affirmed the lower court dismissal.
 
    In August of 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) listed the West Coast steelhead trout as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Casitas, its officers, and the BOR faced possible civil and criminal liability
under section 9 of the ESA if continued operation of the Project resulted in harm to the steelhead trout. A fish ladder was considered a mitigating method and the facility was opened on December 9, 2004.
 
    Casitas said the United States had breached the 1956 Contract. In the alternative, Casitas asserted that, by imposing the operating criteria, the United States had taken Casitas's property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Under its contract theory, Casitas sought reimbursement of the approximately $9.5 million that it had spent to build the fish ladder facility. Under its takings theory, it sought compensation for the water it claimed it had lost by the imposition of the operating
criteria.
 
    On October 2, 2006, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Casitas's contract claim. The court ruled that the costs associated
with the construction of the fish ladder facility were operation and maintenance costs and thus not reimbursable under the Contract. In addition, the court ruled that, even if the government had breached the Contract, the sovereign acts doctrine shielded it from liability. To dispose of the case in the trial court on summary judgment, the parties asked the court to decide only the question of whether a diversion of water as a resultl of the fish ladder would constitute a physical or a regulatory taking. Ruling for the government, the court held that the alleged taking was regulatory because it involved the government's restraint on Casitas's use of its property rather than the government's takeover of the property. Based upon the parties' stipulations, it therefore entered summary judgment for the government on Casitas's takings claims and dismissed the complaint. Casitas appealed the dismissal of its complaint to this court. The Appeals Court agreed.
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Wildlife, #Water, #CAFed]
 
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Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Institution Of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society

Feb 25: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 12-35266. In this case the Appeals Court decides to uphold a high seas piracy claim against an activist group objecting to the legitimate taking of whales for research.
 
    In an opening statement in this partially split decision, the majority states, "You don't need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram ships; hurl glass containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage propellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter how high-minded you believe your purpose to be."
 
    The Appeals Court explains that Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, Cetacean) are Japanese researchers who hunt whales in the Southern Ocean. The United States, Japan and many other nations are signatories to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling which authorizes whale hunting when conducted in compliance with a research permit issued by a
signatory. Cetacean has such a permit from Japan. Nonetheless, it has been hounded on the high seas for years by a group calling itself the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and its "eccentric founder," Paul Watson (collectively Sea Shepherd). Sea Shepherd's tactics include all of those listed above.
 
    Cetacean argues that Sea Shepherd's acts amount to piracy and violate international agreements regulating conduct on the high seas. The district court denied Cetacean's request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed its piracy claims. The majority Appeals Court determined it had jurisdiction over the order denying the injunction and also "have jurisdiction to review the dismissal of the piracy claims because the district court's reasoning for dismissing them is 'inextricably intertwined with' its reasons for denying the preliminary injunction." [citing Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)].
 
    In an interesting twist, an Australian court entered a default judgment against Cetacean, purporting to enjoin it from whaling in Antarctic coastal waters over which Australia claims sovereignty. The majority said, "The district court's deference to Australia's judgment in that case was an abuse of discretion. . . Whatever the status of Cetacean's whaling under Australian law, it gives Sea Shepherd no license to engage in piracy. It is for Australia, not Sea Shepherd, to police Australia's court orders."
 
    The majority also notes that, "Because neither the United States nor Japan recognizes Australia's jurisdiction over any portion of the Southern Ocean, Cetacean owes no respect to the Australian order." The majority opinion indicates, "The district court's orders denying Cetacean's preliminary injunction and dismissing its piracy claims are reversed. The preliminary injunction we issued on December 17, 2012, Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y, 702 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2012), will remain in effect until further order of this court. The district judge's numerous, serious and obvious errors identified in our opinion raise doubts as to whether he will be perceived as impartial in presiding over this high-profile case. The appearance of justice would be served if the case were transferred to another district judge, drawn at random, and we so order in accordance with the standing orders of the Western District of Washington. The panel retains jurisdiction over any further appeals or writs involving this case."
 
    The dissenting Justice indicated in a partially dissenting opinion, "I concur in both the reasoning and the judgment of the panel opinion, reversing the district court's dismissal of Cetacean's piracy claims, and its failure to grant Cetacean a preliminary injunction. Even if one believes it is barbaric to harvest whales for any purpose at the beginning of the 21st century, as practiced by
Cetacean, it is clearly permitted under international law. . . However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reassign this case to a different district judge. . . I see no basis for reassigning this case. Our panel opinion is well-articulated, succinct, and absolutely clear as to what is required of the district judge on remand. . . The Sea Shepherds are pirates. Period. No district judge could fail to grasp the clarity and firmness of our opinion."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). Access the dissenting opinion (click here). [#Wildlife, #CA9]

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Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Feb 25: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Case Nos. 12-1404, 12-1772. Petitions for review of orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Appeals Court indicates that, "Under the applicable standards of judicial review, we deny the petition for review."
 
   The Appeals Court explains that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts petitions for review from the NRC March 8, 2012, order denying the Commonwealth's petition for review of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's (ASLB) denial of Massachusetts's motion to admit a new contention, and other related requests. The NRC rejected the Commonwealth's claims that the environmental findings in the environmental impact statement (EIS), prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), were inadequate in light of the damage to the Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima) nuclear power plant in Japan in March of 2011. The Commonwealth also petitions for review from the NRC's May 25, 2012, vote to renew the license of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and the May 29, 2012 renewed license.
 
    The Commonwealth's substantive challenges to the NRC's decisions are not based in any alleged failure on the part of the NRC to ensure basic health and safety under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Rather, the Commonwealth argues that the Commission's failure to file supplemental analysis on the environmental impacts of relicensing in light of purported new and significant information learned from Fukushima violated its obligations under NEPA and NRC regulations.
 
    The claims made by Massachusetts to the NRC roughly fall into three categories. The first two categories go to whether, in light of Fukushima, the EIS was adequate in its environmental assessments of: (1) spent fuel pool fires; and (2) core damage events. The third category questions whether the decision to proceed with relicensing was contrary to law. The Commonwealth also asserts that the NRC failed to sufficiently consider its own Task Force's report that contained purportedly new and significant information, or explain why it did not require supplementation of the EIS, and Massachusetts claims that it was denied a hearing in violation of the AEA.
 
    In its conclusion, citing the case of Town of Winthrop, 535 F.3d 1, the Appeals Court said it, ". . .found that it was reasonable for an agency to decline to study, in a supplemental EIS, a pollutant for which there was not yet a standard method of measurement or analysis. . . It is similarly reasonable not to delay relicensing until even more information becomes available because the process could otherwise become unending, as new information is always developing. Cf. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373 (explaining that requiring an updated EIS every time new information arises is not practical because agencies would always be 'awaiting updated information only to find the new information outdated by the time a decision is made'). NEPA imposed no obligation on the NRC to withhold the granting of a renewed license here because of the possibility that currently unavailable information might become available in the future."
 
    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Energy/Nuclear, #Haz/Nuclear, #CA1]
 
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