32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
Monday, July 23, 2012
National Chicken Council v. U.S. EPA
Jan 20: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Case No. 10-1107. On Petitions for Review of a Final Action of the U.S. EPA. The Appeals Court summarizes that the National Chicken Council, National Meat Association, and National Turkey Federation petition for review of EPA's interpretation of a provision in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and, "Because the petitioners fail to show that a favorable ruling would redress their claimed injuries, we dismiss their petition on standing grounds."
Under the EISA, ethanol qualifies as a "renewable fuel" under certain circumstances. Ethanol from a production plant that commenced construction after December 19, 2007 (the date of the EISA's enactment) counts as renewable fuel if it "achieves at least a 20 percent reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions" in comparison to fossil fuels. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). Ethanol from a plant that commenced construction on or before December 19, 2007 is not subject to that requirement; it counts as renewable fuel whether it reduces emissions or not. Id. i.e. the older ethanol plants are "grandfathered in."
The statutory provision at issue in this case is an extension of the EISA's grandfather clause. It states that, "[f]or calendar years 2008 and 2009, any ethanol plant that is fired with natural gas, biomass, or any combination thereof is deemed to be in compliance . . . with the 20 percent reduction requirement." The Appeals Court explains, " In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, EPA claimed the provision was ambiguous because it did 'not specify whether [ethanol plants fired with natural gas and/or biomass] are deemed to be in compliance only for the period of 2008 and 2009, or indefinitely.' . . After considering public comments, EPA adopted the latter interpretation in its Final Rule. It read the provision to mean that ethanol plants fired with natural gas and/or biomass that commenced construction in 2008 or 2009 ('qualifying ethanol plants') are deemed compliant with the 20 percent greenhouse gas reduction requirement 'indefinitely.' . . Functionally, that meant qualifying ethanol plants could generate RINs [Renewable Identification Numbers for each gallon of renewable fuel] indefinitely without having to ensure that their ethanol met the emissions-reduction requirement."
The Appeals Court notes that, "The petitioners argue EPA's interpretation of the provision is inconsistent with the statutory text, and they ask us to set it aside. To establish their Article III standing to seek such relief, they must show that they have suffered (or will soon suffer) a 'concrete' injury in fact; that their injury is or will be 'fairly . . . trace[able]' to EPA's interpretation of the provision; and that there is a 'substantial likelihood' their injury would be redressed if we set EPA's interpretation aside."
The Appeals Court concludes, "If we were to vacate EPA's interpretation, the only consequence for qualifying ethanol plants is that they would no longer be able to generate RINs without complying with the EISA's emissions-reduction requirement. The petitioners fail to show a 'substantial probability' that qualifying ethanol plants would reduce their ethanol production as a result of that change. . . We should not be understood to foreclose any challenge to EPA's interpretation of the provision; a different petition, properly supported, could allow us to address the merits of EPA's reading. But the petitioners here have failed to establish their standing, and their petition for review is accordingly dismissed."
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
State Of New Jersey v. EPA
Jan 20: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Case 05-1097 consolidated with 05-1104, 05-1116, 05-1118, 05-1158, 05-1159, 05-1160, 05-1162, 05-1163, 05-1164, 05-1167, 05-1174, 05-1175, 05-1176, 05-1183, 05-1189, 05-1263, 05-1267, 05-1270, 05-1271, 05-1275, 05-1277, 06-1211, 06-1220, 06-1231, 06-1287, 06-1291, 06-1293, 06-1294. The Appeals Court summarizes saying, "In our earlier decision in this case, New Jersey v. EPA, 663 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [See WIMS 1/3/12], we held that Movants, a group of Native American tribes and tribal associations who intervened on behalf of petitioners in the underlying Clean Air Act litigation, were entitled to fees and costs under section 307(f) of the Act. When the parties were unable to agree on the amount of fees, Movants filed an updated motion seeking $369,027.25, including compensation for 1,181 hours of work and for costs. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with EPA that the fee request is excessive and thus award substantially less than Movants seek.
The Appeals Court notes that to calculate a reasonable fee, "we use the lodestar method, multiplying a reasonable rate by the reasonable number of hours." EPA does not object to Movants' proposed hourly rates, and in order to simplify things recommends a flat rate of $305.125 which is agreed to. However, at issue is the "reasonable number of hours." After careful analysis, the Appeals Court concludes, "In sum, Movants reasonably expended 355.95 hours on the litigation. Multiplying this by $305.125 per hour, we award Movants $108,609.24 in compensation for attorney time. We also award Movants the $3,186.50 in costs they seek and that EPA does not contest."
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. EPA
Jul 17: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Case Nos. 10-1079 & 10-1080. On Petitions for Review of Final Action of the U.S. EPA. The Appeals Court explains, that In 2010, U.S. EPA promulgated a final rule adopting a new, one-hour primary national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for nitrogen dioxide. The American Petroleum Institute, the Utility Air Regulatory Group, and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (collectively the API) petition for review of that rule, claiming EPA, in adopting the NAAQS, was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Clean Air Act. API also challenges a statement in the preamble to the final rule regarding EPA's intended implementation of the NAAQS. The Appeals Court ruled, "We deny the petitions insofar as they challenge the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS, but because the EPA's statement in the preamble was not final, we lack jurisdiction to consider those portions of the petitions."
The Appeals Court recounts that, in 2009 the EPA proposed to set a new hourly NAAQS with allowable maximum concentration levels between 80 and 100 ppb. 74 Fed. Reg. 34,404 (July 15, 2009). The petitioners each submitted comments criticizing the EPA for proposing a revision to the NAAQS based upon an unpublished study. . . and for discounting a published and peer-reviewed study that did not conclude exposures to NO2 at 100 ppb caused a measureable adverse health effect. They also expressed skepticism about the EPA's interpretation of the epidemiological evidence, questioned the assumptions built into the forecasts in the REA, and pointed out the proposed rule provided no guidance as to how a permit applicant for a new or modified source of NO2 pollution should demonstrate compliance with the new NAAQS.
In its Final Rule, the EPA adopted a new one-hour primary NAAQS, requiring in effect that "the three-year average of the annual 98th percentile of the daily maximum 1-hour average concentration [be] less than or equal to 100 ppb." The EPA concluded this standard was needed "to provide protection for asthmatics and other at-risk populations against an array of adverse respiratory health effects related to short-term NO2 exposure."
According to the API, the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in how it dealt with the record evidence and the NAAQS it adopted is unlawful because more stringent than "requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety." In addition, the API argued that EPA's implementation of the NAAQS was arbitrary and capricious because, when the EPA stated a permit applicant for a new or modified source of pollution must demonstrate compliance with the new NAAQS, the agency did not consider whether it would be able to resolve applications within the statutorily required time period or what effect such a requirement might have upon economic growth.
The Appeals Court ruled in part, "Considering its duty to err on the side of caution, we conclude the EPA did not act unreasonably by comparing the benefits of the one-hour standard against not only a scenario based upon existing air quality but also upon an alternate scenario in which areas just meet the annual NAAQS set in 1971. For that reason, and because the record adequately supports the EPA's conclusion that material negative health effects result from ambient air concentrations as low as the 100 ppb level, we cannot conclude the agency was arbitrary and capricious or violated the Act in adopting that level as the new one-hour NAAQS for NO2."
Earthjustice, intervened on behalf of Natural Resources Defense Council to oppose the industry challenge. Earthjustice attorney Abigail Dillen issued a brief statement saying, "Nitrogen dioxide pollution triggers asthma attacks and sends people to hospitals and emergency rooms. This decision is great news for children, older adults, and millions of Americans with asthma whose health is endangered by this pollution."
Access the complete opinion (click here). Access a release and statement from Earthjustice (click here). [#Air, #CADC]
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Salazar
Jul 17: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 09-17661. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. In this split decision involving the renewal of forty-one water supply contracts by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation the majority affirms the district court in determining that the contracts do not violate § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act and illegally threatens the existence of the delta smelt.
The delta smelt is a small fish endemic to the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers Delta Estuary which was declared endangered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act in 1993. Though previously
abundant, the population of the delta smelt has diminished markedly in the last several decades.
Plaintiffs, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and several conservation groups, argue that in 2005 the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) renewed forty-one water service contracts with various water users without conducting an adequate consultation under § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act and that the contracts jeopardize the existence of the delta smelt. The contracts at issue fall into two groups: (1) users who obtain water from the Delta-Mendota Canal (DMC Contractors); and (2) parties who claim to hold water rights senior to those held by the Bureau with regard to the Central Valley Project (CVP) and who previously entered into settlement contracts with the Bureau (Settlement Contractors).
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that they did not have standing to challenge the DMC contracts. The majority Appeals Court determined, "Even under a substantive claim analysis for standing, which imposes a higher burden than a procedural analysis, plaintiffs' claim fails because they cannot show causation. . . Thus, the district court properly determined that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the DMC contracts under both a procedural and a substantive claim analysis."
Additionally, the majority ruled, ". . .the Bureau's discretion is limited with regard to the Settlement Contracts so that § 7(a)(2) of the ESA is not triggered. The Bureau's hands are tied historically by those asserting senior water rights in the CVP. The Bureau was required to acknowledge such rights in order to operate the CVP, which it did by entering the Settlement Contracts. We agree with the district court . . ."
The dissenting justice said, "I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that this case is not moot. I disagree with the majority's holdings that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Bureau's renewal of the Delta-Mendota Canal (DMC) contracts and that § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), does not apply to the United States Bureau of Reclamation's (Bureau) renewals of the Sacramento River Settlement ("SRS") contracts. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants and remand for further proceedings."
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
Monday, July 16, 2012
Webster v. USDA
Jul 13: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, Case No. 11-1739. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. The Appeals Court provides background saying that over thirty-five years ago, the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), working with local sponsors, devised a project to provide watershed protection, flood prevention, and recreation along the Lost River Subwatershed. The proposed project involved a combination of land-treatment measures and five dams and impoundments. In 1974, the NRCS issued an environmental impact statement relating to the project, and since that time, three dams and most of the land-treatment measures have been completed.
After preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement in 2009, the NRCS issued a record of decision that eliminated one of the remaining dams from the project and authorized construction of the final dam for the added purpose of providing water supply. Appellants, seven individuals who allege that their land will be adversely affected by this final dam's construction, filed this action contending that the NRCS has failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Appellants appeal the district court's order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Because we determine that the The Appeals Court ruled, "NRCS has complied with the procedures mandated by the NEPA and taken a hard look at the project's environmental effects, we affirm."
On one issue raised by Appellants the Appeals Court rules, "Even assuming that the NRCS did not ask the Army Corps to participate as a cooperating agency and that it should have done so, such error was harmless. See United States v. Coal.
for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2011) (recognizing that harmless-error review applies to violations of the NEPA). Despite bearing the burden to establish harm, see id., Appellants fail to show, or even suggest, any harm that resulted from the failure to designate the Army Corps as a cooperating agency. Nor do we identify any harm resulting from this failure. In fact, the record reflects that the NRCS provided the Army Corps opportunities to participate in preparing both the 2007 SEIS and the 2009 SEIS, and that the Army Corps took advantage of at least some of these opportunities. . ."
On another issue, "Appellants argue that the NRCS should not have issued the 2009 SEIS prior to receiving the Clean Water Act Section 404 permit from the Army Corps. But we are aware of no requirement that the NRCS obtain necessary permits before issuing an EIS. To the contrary, the CEQ's regulations mandate only that it list all necessary federal permits in a draft EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25(b). Thus, the NRCS's issuance of the 2009 SEIS before obtaining the requisite permit from the Army Corps does not violate the NEPA."
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
Friday, July 13, 2012
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Providence Washington Ins
Jul 12: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, No. 11-2193. Appealed from the District Court of Rhode Island, Providence. In summarizing the case the Appeals Court indicates that, invoking diversity jurisdiction, appellant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, Inc. (Travelers) sought a declaratory judgment that appellee Providence Washington Insurance Company, Inc. (PWIC) is obliged to join in the defense of New England Container Company, Inc. (NE Container or NECC), in connection with a contribution action involving clean-up costs for the Rhode Island Centredale Manor Superfund Site. Granting summary judgment to PWIC, the district court ruled that PWIC did not owe NE Container a duty to defend in the underlying action. The Appeals Court ruled, "On Travelers' appeal, we reverse the decision, vacate the judgment, and remand."
The Appeals Court concludes, "In the end, we conclude that under the pleadings test, the Emhart complaint [Emhart Industries, Inc. also a responsible party] triggered PWIC's duty to defend under its policies issued in the mid-1980s. In so holding, we recognize that there is exponentially more to this sprawling litigation than the Emhart complaint and the PWIC policies. Litigation involving environmental damage at the Superfund Site was well on its way prior to the 2006 Emhart action, and the Emhart action had advanced beyond a nascent stage by the time Travelers pursued its 2010 action against PWIC. The duty to defend question before us, however, begins and ends with the Rhode Island pleadings test. Having concluded this task, our review is complete.
"We reverse the district court's decision, vacate the judgment in favor of PWIC, and remand for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Travelers that the Emhart complaint triggered PWIC's defense obligations under its policies. Any remaining requests for relief sought by Travelers will be addressed by the district court in due course."
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. U.S.
Jul 12: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, Case Nos. 2011-5044, 2011-5045. Appealed from the United States Court of Federal Claims. In this partially mixed opinion, Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E), Kansas City Power & Light Company (KCPL), and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (KEPCO) (collectively the Kansas Companies) suffered damages due to the Government's partial breach of the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel And/Or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract). In June 2010, the United States Court of Federal Claims conducted a nine-day trial and awarded the Kansas Companies $10,632,454.83.
The majority indicated, "In determining the amount of damages, the trial court correctly did not award damages for cost of capital and for the costs associated with researching alternative storage options for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW). The trial court also appropriately reduced the Kansas Companies' damages by the value of the benefit they received as a result of their mitigation activities. However, the trial court erred by not accepting the Kansas Companies' reasonable method for calculating overhead costs. Therefore, this court affirms-in-part and reverses-in-part the trial court's damages award."
The majority court ruled, "The Kansas Companies' method for calculating over-head costs was reasonable and complied with FERC accounting standards. As such, this court reverses the trial court's refusal to accept these calculations. This court affirms the remainder of the trial court's decision. As such, there is no need to address the issues raised in the Government's cross-appeal."
In a partial dissent, one Justice indicated, "The majority concludes that when the Kansas Companies used Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-compliant accounting practices to allocate overhead to their mitigation efforts, they were dispositively entitled to recover the full amount of that overhead as damages. I respectfully disagree. When, as here, a trial court is presented with evidence that regulatory accounting practices were used to calculate the amount of overhead attributable to mitigation projects, that amount is presumptively a correct measure of damages for over-head. And our precedent firmly establishes that a trial court is not free to disregard it simply because it questions the precision of the accepted accounting practice."
Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Haz/Nuclear, #CAFed]
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32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
32 Years of Environmental Reporting for serious Environmental Professionals
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