Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Modesto Irrigation District v. Gutierrez
Aug 20: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 09-15214. This Endangered Species Act (ESA) case is a challenge to the decision of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to list the steelhead, a type of Pacific salmon, as a threatened species in California's Central Valley. In listing the steelhead, NMFS defined it as a distinct species under the ESA, separate from rainbow trout, another type of Pacific salmon that breeds with and looks like the steelhead. The separate listing was a departure from the prior NMFS policy of classifying interbreeding Pacific salmon as a single species.
Plaintiffs are irrigation districts in California's Central Valley whose operations are impeded by the listing. They contend that the listing violated the ESA because steelhead and rainbow trout interbreed, and the statute therefore requires NMFS to treat them as a single species. Plaintiffs also contend that NMFS violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing adequately to explain its decision to adopt a new policy for classifying the fish.
The Appeals Court said, "We agree with the district court that under the ESA, interbreeding is not alone determinative of whether organisms must be classified alike where, as here, they develop and behave differently. We also find that NMFS' explanation for its change of policy satisfies the standards set forth in the Supreme Court's recent decision in F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). We therefore affirm."
In its conclusion the Appeals Court said, "The two narrow issues before this panel involve first a question of statutory interpretation and second, whether an agency provided an adequate justification for a policy change. We agree with the district court that the definition of "species" in the ESA did not require NMFS to place interbreeding steelhead and rainbow trout in the same DPS. We further hold that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Fox, NMFS sufficiently justified its decision to apply the DPS Policy to O.mykiss. We therefore affirm the district court."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Sheffield v. City of Fort Thomas
Sep 3: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Case No. 09-5619. Plaintiff William Sheffield challenges several municipal ordinances enacted by the city of Fort Thomas, Kentucky, alleging that the ordinances violate the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and that the ordinances are preempted by Kentucky state statutes and administrative regulations. The district court rejected all of Sheffield's challenges.
The case involves the fact that between 1950 and the present day, the deer population within the state of Kentucky increased approximately five-hundredfold. According to the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources (DFWR), "deer are reaching a saturation point in many parts of the Commonwealth." Among the regions is the heavily wooded area surrounding the city of Fort Thomas (a suburb of Cincinnati, Ohio), whose residents have suffered increasingly from motor vehicle collisions with deer, landscaping damage due to deer, and other cervid-perpetrated problems. Eventually, the members of the Fort Thomas City Council decided to take action.
Beginning in October 2006, a city administrative officer worked with DFWR representatives to develop a deer-management plan. Various options were considered, ranging from implementing a catch-and-release program to administering a birth-control drug derived from pig ovaries. In the end, the City Council opted for a three-part approach: (1) educating the public about deer-control tactics; (2) prohibiting deer feeding; and (3) permitting the hunting of deer by bow and arrow within the city limits, which DFWR representatives had advised was the most effective means of controlling the deer population in an urban area.
Plaintiff, Sheffield claims are: (1) that all three Ordinances are preempted by Kentucky Statutes, which broadly regulates the Commonwealth's wildlife resources, and/or by Kentucky Administrative Regulations, which more concretely regulates hunting; (2) that the Bow-and-Arrow Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution because it infringes on his asserted "fundamental right to be free from a risk of serious bodily harm" and/or lacks a rational basis; and (3) that the Deer-Feeding Ordinance violates those same constitutional provisions because it is void for vagueness.
The district court rejected all of Sheffield's challenges. The Appeals Court said, "With one exception, we agree with that conclusion. We hold, however, that the district court erred in concluding that Kentucky administrative regulations have no preemptive force as against Kentucky municipal ordinances. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Thursday, August 19, 2010
U.S. v. Agosto-Vega
Aug 18: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Case No. 09-1158 & 09-1159. This is a consolidated appeal from a jury verdict which found Appellants Braulio Agosto-Vega (Agosto) and Braulio Agosto Motors, Inc. (Agosto Motors) guilty of violating criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The principal issue presented is whether Appellants were deprived of their constitutional right to a public trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. The Appeals Court found that the District Court committed a structural error by excluding the public from the courtroom during the selection of the jury.
The Appeals Court cited Presley v. Georgia, S. Ct. 721 (Jan. 19, 2010) and said, "We are thus required to vacate Appellants' convictions and remand their cases for a new trial. Nevertheless, considering that Appellants will have a new trial on the same charges, to prevent an allegation that they will be subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment by reason of this retrial, it is incumbent upon us to address Appellants' contentions that the government failed to present sufficient evidence at the first trial to allow the jury to conclude that they were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges presented against them. . . We conclude that the government proved the charges against Appellants by sufficient evidence to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Count One of the indictment charged Agosto with conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States. The CWA prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant" without a permit pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge System. The knowing violation of this prohibition is a felony and CWA defines the discharge of a pollutant as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source," discharged into water. The term "navigable waters" is defined as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." The Appeals Court said, "Using either Justice Kennedy's or the plurality's test in Rapanos, the government presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the required jurisdictional nexus. Agosto's guilt was established as to Count One.
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
U.S. v. Magnesium Corp. of America
Aug 17: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Case No. 08-4185. As its name advertises, U.S. Magnesium produces magnesium, though in doing so it also generates various waste byproducts. The lawsuit concerns five of those wastes. The government says that U.S. Magnesium's handling of the wastes must, but hasn't, complied with regulations promulgated under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). For its part, U.S.Magnesium challenges the premise of the government's suit, arguing that the U.S. EPA exempted the five wastes from Subtitle C's strictures in a prior interpretation of its own regulation. And, U.S. Magnesium says, the Agency cannot change that interpretation now, at least not without first complying with the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
At summary judgment, the district court agreed with U.S. Magnesium and entered judgment in its favor. However, the Appeals Court said, "We must vacate that judgment. Even if we assume with U.S. Magnesium that a definitive regulatory interpretation prohibits an agency from later changing course and issuing a new interpretation without first undergoing notice and comment, that's simply not our case. The only prior EPA interpretation U.S.Magnesium can point to is, at best, a tentative one. Because EPA never previously adopted a definitive interpretation, it remained free, even under the legal precedents on which U.S. Magnesium seeks to rely, to change its mind and issue a new interpretation of its own regulations without assuming notice and comment obligations."
The Appeals Court concluded, "For purposes of summary, we hold that EPA hasn't previously adopted a definitive interpretation of its 1991 rule. Even under the case law U.S. Magnesium asks us to follow, the Agency is at liberty to adopt without notice and comment a reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous regulation. At least before us, U.S. Magnesium does not dispute that EPA has done so with this litigation. For this reason, we vacate the entry of summary judgment in U.S. Magnesium's favor and remand this matter to the district court. We do not prejudge what, if any, further proceedings may be appropriate in that court in light of and consistent with this opinion."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Northwest Environmental Defense Center. v. Brown
Aug 17: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 07-35266. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester and members of the Oregon Board of Forestry in their official capacities and various timber companies. NEDC argues that Defendants violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations by not obtaining permits from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for stormwater -- largely rainwater -- runoff that flows from logging roads into systems of ditches, culverts, and channels and is then discharged into forest streams and rivers. NEDC contends that these discharges are from "point sources" within the meaning of the CWA and that they therefore require permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
The district court concluded that the discharges are exempted from the NPDES permitting process by the Silvicultural Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 122.27, promulgated under the CWA to regulate discharges associated with silvicultural activity. The Appeals Court said, "The district court did not reach the question whether the discharges are exempted by amendments to the CWA made in 1987. We reach both questions and conclude that the discharges require NPDES permits."
The Appeals Court explained in its concluding statements, "Until now, EPA has acted on the assumption that NPDES permits are not required for discharges of pollutants from ditches, culverts, and channels that collect stormwater runoff from logging roads. EPA has therefore not had occasion to establish a permitting process for such discharges. But we are confident, given the closely analogous NPDES permitting process for stormwater runoff from other kinds of roads, that EPA will be able to do so effectively and relatively expeditiously.
". . .we conclude that stormwater runoff from logging roads that is collected by and then discharged from a system of ditches, culverts, and channels is a point source discharge for which an NPDES permit is required. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss, and we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Monday, August 16, 2010
Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Company
Aug 12: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Case No. 09-2862. Sierra Club brought this Clean Air Act (CAA) citizen suit against Otter Tail Power Company, MDU Resources Group, and Northwestern Energy, who own and operate the Big Stone Generating Station, a coal fired power plant near the border between South Dakota and Minnesota. Sierra Club alleged that Otter Tail violated the CAA by failing to obtain permits for a series of modifications to the plant and by exceeding applicable emission limits. The district court granted Otter Tail's motion to dismiss, and Sierra Club timely appealed. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court opinion.
By way of background, the Appeals Court explains that the Big Stone Generating Station is a 450 megawatt coal fired power plant located in Big Stone City, South Dakota. Otter Tail Power Company operates the plant. Big Stone has undergone various physical and operational modifications since it began operating in 1975. Sierra Club alleges that three of those modifications triggered PSD and NSPS obligations which Otter Tail has violated.
The Appeals Court indicates that Sierra Club commenced this suit in June 2008 under the CAA's "citizen suit" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), seeking assessment of civil penalties against Otter Tail as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. It alleged that Otter Tail had violated the CAA by failing to obtain PSD permits before commencing the three modifications described above. It also claimed that Otter Tail continued to violate the CAA by operating without permits and without abiding by the BACT emission limits which would have been imposed as part of the PSD permitting process. Finally, Sierra Club alleged that Big Stone was operating in violation of NSPS limits triggered by the 2001 ethanol plant project.
Otter Tail moved to dismiss, arguing that Sierra Club's PSD claims were untimely and that the NSPS claim was an impermissible collateral attack on Otter Tail's operating permit. The district court granted the motion. It interpreted the CAA's PSD provisions as imposing upon operators only a one time obligation to obtain a permit before construction or modification of a facility, as opposed to imposing ongoing conditions on its operation. It reasoned that any violation of these provisions would have thus occurred when modifications were commenced. Since the last modification was begun in 2001, Sierra Club's PSD civil penalty claims were barred by the five year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Although § 2462 does not apply to equitable relief, the district court decided that Sierra Club's claims for equitable relief were foreclosed under the concurrent remedy doctrine because its civil penalty claims were time barred.
The district court dismissed the NSPS claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because that claim essentially attacks the terms of Otter Tail's amended Title V permit rather than Otter Tail's compliance with the permit, the district court concluded that Sierra Club should have raised the NSPS issue in administrative proceedings during the permitting process. Since judicial review of issues that may be raised through that process is vested exclusively in the courts of appeals, the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the NSPS claim.
On one issue, the Appeals Court explained its rationale and said, "Sierra Club may be correct that the district court's interpretation of §§ 7661d and 7607 restricts the permit shield's applicability, but this does not persuade us that its interpretation is erroneous. While § 7661c(f) is a statutory defense to liability, §7607(b)(2) limits district court subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent the two provisions are in tension, the jurisdictional limit is paramount. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 1718 (1951) ('The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . . .'); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ('It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the] limited jurisdiction' of the federal courts.). Sierra Club argues that our interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions should not curtail the scope of the permit shield, but the more fundamental rule of construction holds that we must not expand federal court jurisdiction in service to a broad reading of the permit shield.
"Moreover, our interpretation of § 7607(b) does not render the permit shield entirely superfluous. Our holding is limited to the circumstances of this case. While we decline to delve into other contexts in which the permit shield may play a role, we note that the considerations underlying our decision would not necessarily be present . . . We conclude that because Sierra Club could have obtained judicial review of its NSPS claim through the process established by 42 U.S.C. § 7661d, district court review of that claim is foreclosed by § 7607(b)(2). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Great Rivers Habitat Alliance v. FEMA
Aug 12: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Case No. 09-3183. Great Rivers Habitat Alliance (Great Rivers) and the Adolphus A. Busch Revocable Living Trust (Busch Trust) (collectively, appellants) appeal the dismissal of their case for lack of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge presiding with the consent of the parties. The district court found appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA), and further found the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply. Appellants argue the case was dismissed in error because they had in fact exhausted their administrative remedies, and in any event should be allowed to proceed under the APA. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court decision.
On the APA claim, the Appeals Court said, "Because the APA only grants judicial review of final agency action in cases 'for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,' 5 U.S.C. § 704, the district court did not err in dismissing appellants' APA claim, because 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) provides an adequate legal remedy."
On the jurisdictional question the Appeals Court said it can be "reduced to whether appellants challenged FEMA's decision on the basis of the decisions' scientific or technical accuracy in accordance with § 4104(b). In order to appeal a determination on the basis of scientific or technical accuracy, FEMA's regulations require supporting documentation. . . Appellants did not point to any mathematical or measurement error, changed physical conditions, or lack of sufficient quality data to support the allegations . . . We agree with the district court that appellants' challenge was not based upon the scientific or technical accuracy of the LOMR [Letter of Map Revision], and thus did not constitute an appeal within the meaning of 44 C.F.R. § 67.6."
The Appeals Court said finally, ". . . the regulations require appellants to certify new information so FEMA can conduct another analysis. This is precisely what appellants failed to do in this case. Instead, appellants attempt to force FEMA to reanalyze the existing data, hoping for a different result, without submitting any new certified technical data showing the first analysis contained mathematical or measurement errors, or physical conditions have changed. Because appellants did not submit new scientific or technical information, and what they did submit was not certified by an engineer or surveyor, appellants are relying on nothing but the data in FEMA's files. The district court correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a proper appeal with FEMA."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
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