Thursday, February 25, 2010
Niagara Mohawk Power Assn. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Gintis v. Bouchard Transportation Co.
Monday, February 22, 2010
Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. US
Precision Pine subsequently brought the suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, alleging that suspension of the contracts breached both express and implied warranties. The trial court agreed with Precision Pine. On liability, it granted summary judgment in favor of Precision Pine, concluding that the government breached both an express contractual warranty and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Precision Pine I or liability decision). Following this decision, the case was transferred to a different judge for the sole purpose of adjudicating damages. After five years of discovery, a twenty-four day bench trial, and extensive supplemental briefing, the trial court awarded $3,343,712 in damages to Precision Pine (Precision Pine V or preliminary damages decision). The United States then appealed the liability determination and damages award. The Appeals Court reversed the lower court decision.
Although the contract dates and terms differ slightly, the Appeals Court said "for our purposes the issues posed are the same." The Appeals Court said, "Seven of the contracts present the question of whether a particular clause (CT 6.25) created an express warranty and, if so, whether it was breached. If CT 6.25 did create an express warranty, then we must also decide whether the government breached its implied duty to cooperate as to those contracts. For eleven of the contracts, we must also decide whether the United States breached its implied duty not to hinder. We conclude that the answer to each of these questions is no. Clause CT 6.25 of the contracts did not create an express warranty, and the Forest Service's actions did not breach any implied duty to cooperate or not to hinder. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's liability decision and vacate the damages award for all contracts, except the Hay contract. Because the government concedes it lacked authority to suspend the Hay contract, we remand for further proceedings as to that contract. For the other thirteen contracts, the trial court should enter judgment for the United States."
Monday, February 15, 2010
WIMS Publishing Notice
Thursday, February 11, 2010
John Dubinsky v. Mermart
The Appeals Court said further, "We agree with the district court that the negligence claim is an enforcement action under the Subordination Agreement. Id. Similarly, we find that, like the negligence claim, the failure to make interest payments due to the characterization of the lead paint remediation as an "upgrade expense," is a matter that arises out of the Financing Documents. . . We affirm the dismissal of the negligence and unjust enrichment claims because the Subordinate Bondholders did not obtain written permission to sue. . .
"Finally, the Subordinate Bondholders argue that Mermart made fraudulent misrepresentations pertaining to the absence of lead-based paint. Mermart counters that any such alleged statements are also covered solely by contractual duties. . . we find that the claimed fraudulent misrepresentation is also a matter that arises out of the Financing Documents. Again, we affirm the dismissal of this claim because the Subordinate Bondholders did not first obtain the written permission from the Senior Mortgagee to sue."
Access the complete opinion (click here).
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Crandall v. Denver
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
River Runners For Wilderness v. Martin (Interior Dept.)
On one of the primary issues of concern, i.e. noise, or "impairment of the natural soundscape;" the Appeals Court said, "Plaintiffs argue that the Park Service failed to consider 28 previous studies, but they identify no specific studies for the court to consider. Nor do Plaintiffs cite any recent studies that call into question the findings of the 1993 and 2003 studies. Defendants also note that any studies conducted in the 1970s would have concerned louder two-stroke engines rather than the quieter and cleaner four-stroke engines now used in the Corridor. Finally, the 2003 study specifically considered and summarized the earlier studies relied on by Plaintiffs. Given all of these considerations, the court cannot conclude that the Park Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it concluded that motorized uses do not impair the soundscape of the Park within the meaning of the Organic Act."
Access the complete opinion (click here).