Myers v. U.S.

Jul 15: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 09-56092. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Plaintiffs seek damages from the United States for injuries to a child allegedly caused by exposure to the toxic heavy metal thallium from soil dumped into a landfill adjacent to the child's residence and school. The child, by her guardian ad litem, appeals a decision of the district court finding that the United States acted "reasonably" and did not breach any duty in conducting the soil remediation project. The district court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, because the "discretionary function" exception to tort liability of the United States applies in this case. In a partially split decision, the Appeals Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

 

    The majority opinion concluded, "Because the district court erred in holding that the "discretionary function" exception barred the Navy's liability on and the court's subject matter jurisdiction over Myers's claim, and clearly erred in finding that the Navy acted "reasonably" and not in breach of its duty in conducting the remediation of contaminated soil in the project at issue here, we reverse and remand this action for further proceedings. Nevertheless, we find it unnecessary to reassign the case to a different judge on remand."

 

    In a partial concurrence and partial dissent on Justice indicated, "I concur in that portion of the majority opinion concluding that additional factfinding is warranted. However, I would remand the case to the district court for that additional factfinding rather than direct a verdict for Plaintiffs as the majority has done. I also agree that there is no need to assign the case to a different judge on remand. . . I respectfully dissent from the balance of the majority opinion.

 

    Access the complete opinion and partial dissent (click here). [*Toxics, #CA9]

Sierra Club v. Southwestern Electric Power Co

Jul 14: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Case Nos: 10-3452 & 10-3456. Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana. The Sierra Club and several related parties brought the suit against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) in February 2010, seeking to set aside a Clean Water Act permit (the § 404 permit) the Corps had issued to the Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) which planned to construct a new power plant.

 

    After SWEPCO intervened as a defendant, the Sierra Club moved to enjoin construction of the plant. The Hempstead County Hunting Club (Hunting Club) filed a similar action against SWEPCO, the Corps, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in July 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that SWEPCO, the Corps, and the FWS failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and Arkansas state law.

 

    The district court granted only part of the injunctive relief requested in the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction. It first held that the Sierra Club and the Hunting Club had standing to challenge the activities authorized under the § 404 permit and then that they had satisfied the criteria for a preliminary injunction, including showing a likely threat of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. It ordered all "work authorized by the § 404 permit" to "halt immediately."

 

    SWEPCO's appealed the preliminary injunctions ordered in each case. SWEPCO argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to show an injury in fact on their NEPA, CWA, and ESA claims. It also contends that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's limited injunction citing Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, 689–90 (8th Cir. 2003).

 

    Further explaining the decision, the Appeals Court said, "The district court found that an injunction was in the public interest because it would convey to the public the importance of having its government agencies fulfill 'their obligations and comply[] with the laws that bind them.' The district court rejected SWEPCO's arguments that an injunction would put at risk hundreds of jobs and threaten the electric generating capacity of a region in need. '[O]utside of SWEPCO's bare assertions,' it noted, there was 'no other evidence of need . . . anywhere in the record.'

 

    "The district court's analysis on this element is sound. We agree that, just as important as the public interest in potential economic gains is 'the public's confidence that its government agencies act independently, thoroughly, and transparently when

reviewing permit applications.' The 'environmental dangers at stake in this case are serious,' see Davis, 302 F.3d at 1116, and the public interests that might be injured by a preliminary injunction, such as temporary loss of jobs or delays in increasing energy output in the region, 'do not outweigh the public interests that will be served.' Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1138.

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Water, #Energy, #CA8]

NRDC v. West Coast Seafood Processors Association

June 6: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case Nos. 09-16245 and 09-16796. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In brief summary the Appeals Court indicated that West Coast Seafood Processors Association (WCSPA) appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to intervene as a defendant in the case, in which the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and Pacific Marine Conservation Council, Inc. (together, NRDC) challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) program to preserve groundfish species off the coast of California, Oregon, and Washington. In a split decision, the Appeals Court ruled simply that, "Because the litigation between NRDC and NMFS has ended, we dismiss WCSPA's appeal as moot."

 

    Ruling on one aspect of the case, the majority Appeals Court said, "It is not reasonable to expect that this dispute about timeliness will arise again. The hybrid Groundfish Plan/Specifications litigation is over. Although NRDC will likely challenge future Specifications and WCSPA will likely file future motions to intervene, the timeliness issue, which is the subject of this appeal, will not likely reappear (as it did not appear in any of the other cases in which the NRDC challenged earlier Specifications and in which WCSPA successfully intervened), unless the same unlikely, hybrid scenario develops again over the next decade. Such a speculative possibility does not constitute a 'reasonable expectation.'"

 

    In a lengthy dissenting opinion, one justice ruled, ". . .I conclude the case survives mootness because it falls in the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to mootness. I would thus reach the merits of the appeal and reverse." He said further, "

I conclude that this case falls within the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to mootness. This exception applies if two requirements are met: '(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.' Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam). The present case meets both of these requirements."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [*Wildlife, CA9]

In Re: Aiken County (Yucca Mountain Repository)

Jul 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Dircuit, Case Nos. 10-1050, 10-1052, 10-1069 & 10-1082. On Petitions for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Petitions for Extraordinary Relief, and Petitions for Review. As the Appeals Court explained, three state and local governmental units, along with individual citizens, petitioned the court for review of and other relief from two "determinations" made by the Department of Energy (DOE") and the other respondents: (1) the DOE's attempt to withdraw the application it submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) for a license to construct a permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; and (2) the DOE's apparent decision to abandon development of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository. The Appeals Court ruled unanimously, with two concurring opinions, "Because we believe that Petitioners' two claims are, respectively, not ripe for judicial determination and not justiciable by this court, we dismiss the petitions for lack of jurisdiction."

 

    In explaining the petitioners and their claim, the Appeals Court said, "The present petitioners argue that recent actions taken by the DOE—which at the very least demonstrate the DOE's desire to abandon development of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository -- violate the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Three of the petitioners -- Aiken County in South Carolina, the State of South Carolina, and the State of Washington -- are state or local governments of localities that are home to sites that temporarily store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste pending the opening of a federal nuclear waste repository. The remaining petitioners are three private citizens who live and work near one of those sites. Put succinctly, Petitioners believe that if the federal government abandons the Yucca Mountain nuclear repository, the only congressionally-approved site for permanently disposing of the nation's spent nuclear waste will be lost and the federal government will fail to comply with its statutory responsibility to provide for the permanent disposal of all of the nation's high-level radioactive waste."

 

    The Appeals Court finds that, "First, the Commission has not yet decided whether it will review the Licensing Board's denial of the DOE motion to withdraw. If the Commission declines to review the denial, the DOE will have failed in its attempt to withdraw the Yucca Mountain application and Petitioners' first claim will be moot. The same outcome will occur if the Commission chooses to review and then upholds the Licensing Board's denial of the DOE motion. The only way in which Petitioner's first claim will not become moot is if the Commission chooses to review and then reverses the Licensing Board's denial. . ."

 

    Petitioners' second claim challenges DOE actions which are simply not reviewable by this court. Petitioners characterize the

agency action challenged in their second claim as the 'determination made on or about January 29, 2010, by Respondents President Obama, Secretary Chu and DOE to unilaterally and irrevocably terminate the Yucca Mountain repository process mandated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270.' Agency actions are reviewable by courts of appeal under the terms of 5 U.S.C. § 704. That section delineates reviewable actions as '[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court . . . .' Petitioners have failed to identify any agency action coming within that delineation. Otherwise put, petitioners have set forth no discrete action mandated by the NWPA that the DOE has failed to perform or performed inadequately. . ."

 

    Finally, the Appeals Court concludes, "The NWPA set forth a process and schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of a federal repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. At this point in that process, the DOE has submitted a construction license application for the Yucca Mountain repository and the Commission maintains a statutory duty to review that application. Despite the respondents' pronouncements and apparent intentions, unless and until Petitioners are able to demonstrate that one of the respondents has either violated a clear duty to act or otherwise affirmatively violated the law, Petitioners' challenges to the ongoing administrative process are premature. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Petitioners' claims. The petitions are dismissed."

 

    Among the two concurring opinions, Justice Kavanaugh wrote a lengthy opinion saying, "This case is a mess because the executive agency (the Department of Energy) and the independent agency (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) have overlapping statutory responsibilities with respect to the Yucca Mountain project. In particular, both agencies have critical roles in interpreting the relevant statutes and in exercising discretion under those laws. Of importance here, the statutes give the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission the final word in the Executive Branch on whether the Executive Branch may terminate the Yucca Mountain project. At the President's direction, the Department of Energy decided to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application and terminate the Yucca Mountain nuclear storage project. A board within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission preliminarily rejected the decision of the Department of Energy (and thus of the President) to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application. But the full Nuclear Regulatory Commission has yet to decide whether it will approve or reject the decision of the Department of Energy. Because the Commission has not yet acted on the Department of Energy's request, the Court's opinion today properly holds this case unripe under the existing legal framework. . ."

 

    He concludes, "This case is a dramatic illustration of the continuing significance and implications of Humphrey's Executor. As a result of Humphrey's Executor and the current statutory scheme, the President does not have the final word in the Executive Branch about whether to terminate the Yucca Mountain project. For now, therefore, the ball in this case rests in the Executive Branch not with the President, but rather with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

 

    In response to the court's decision, Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) and Environment and the Economy Subcommittee Chairman John Shimkus (R-IL), who have been holding hearings investigating the Yucca Mountain issue, released a statement, "The court's decision underscores the urgency for the NRC to complete action on the Yucca repository licensing application. With Commissioner Ostendorff set for another term, the NRC must now come together and finalize its vote on the Atomic Safety Licensing Board's ruling that DOE cannot withdraw Yucca's application. The Obama administration has already chosen to squander $15 billion; decades of scientific research and bipartisan collaboration hang in the balance, and taxpayers remain on the hook for billions of dollars more in future liability claims. Chairman Jaczko's politically motivated efforts to manipulate and steamroll this process, brought to light by the NRC Inspector General and career scientists, will no longer be tolerated. It's time for the NRC to get back to work and complete its job."

 

    Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid did not issue a release, but indicated in a Twitter posting, "Great day for Nevada. Court decision marks imp. win in battle 2 put Yucca Mtn. project 2 rest."

 

    Access the complete opinion and concurrences (click here). Access the statement from Reps. Upton and Shimkus (click here). Access Sen. Reid's Twitter posting (click here) [*Haz/Nuclear, #CADC]

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. U.S. EPA

Jul 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Case No. 10-1056. On Petition for Review of a Final Action of the Environmental Protection Agency. In this important case the Appeals Court addresses the highly controversial issue of regulatory "guidance" versus officially promulgated rules. The Appeals Court indicates, "Yet again we face a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation of ozone under the Clean Air Act. At issue this time is an EPA "guidance document" addressing obligations of regions still in nonattainment of a now-revoked ozone air quality standard."

 

    The Appeals Court indicates, "Petitioner argues that the Guidance amounts to a legislative rule issued in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment requirement and that its substantive content is contrary to law. Firing nearly all the arrows in its jurisdictional quiver, EPA argues that petitioner lacks standing, that the Guidance does not qualify as final agency action, and that petitioner's claims are unripe for judicial review. As we explain in this opinion, all three arrows miss their target. On the merits, we conclude that the Guidance qualifies as a legislative rule that EPA was required to issue through notice and comment rulemaking and that one of its features -- the so-called attainment alternative -- violates the Clean Air Act's plain language. We therefore grant the petition for review and vacate the Guidance. . .

 

    "Now before us is EPA's latest attempt to reconcile the 8-hour standard with Subpart 2. This time its effort relates only to the application of section 185 fees to the eight regions in severe or extreme nonattainment of the 1-hour standard: Baltimore, Baton Rouge, Houston, New York City, Sacramento, the San Joaquin Valley, the South Coast Air Basin (CA), and the Southeast Desert (CA). Because attainment deadlines for the eight regions have now expired, all are in the process of developing section 185 implementation plans. Faced with the prospect of hefty fees, industry groups complained to EPA that because they already had in place the best available emission control technology, they could reduce emissions and thus avoid fees only by cutting production."

 

    EPA issued a "Guidance" document aimed at Regional Air Division Directors -- the agency officials directly responsible for implementation plan approval --  Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning & Standards to Regional Air Division Directors 3 (Jan. 5, 2010) (Fee Program Guidance). In other words, EPA believes 1-hour nonattainment areas have flexibility to choose between the statutorily mandated program and an equivalent -- i.e., the program alternative.

In addition to that alternative, the Guidance explains, regions attaining either the 1-hour or the 8-hour standard can avoid section 185 fees through an "attainment alternative."

 

    NRDC argues that EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing the Guidance without notice and comment and that both the program and attainment alternatives violate the Clean Air Act. In response, EPA argues that NRDC lacks standing, that the Guidance fails to qualify as final agency action, and that NRDC's challenges are unripe for review. On the merits, EPA contends that the Guidance is either a policy statement or an interpretive rule and, in either case, is exempt from the notice and comment requirement. It also defends both alternatives as permissible exercises of statutory gapfilling. Numerous industry groups, including the American Chemistry Council and the South Coast Air Quality Management District have intervened in support of EPA.

 

    In a concluding statement the Appeals Court said, ". . .as we have said before, "[i]f the Environmental Protection Agency disagrees with the Clean Air Acts' requirements . . . , it should take its concerns to Congress. . . . In the meantime, it must obey the Clean Air Act as written by Congress and interpreted by this court." Sierra Club, 479 F.3d at 884."

     Access the complete opinion (click here). [*Air, #CADC]

Sierra Club v. Lisa Jackson

Jul 1: the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Case No. 10-5280. Appealed from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Appellants, nonprofit environmentalist organizations, appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court in an action against the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, challenging the Administrator's failure to take action to prevent the construction of three proposed pollution-emitting facilities in Kentucky. The district court held that there was no mandatory duty to act and granted the EPA's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds.

 

    The three projects underlying this litigation are the East Kentucky Power Cooperative's J.K. Smith Generating Station coal-fired CFB Boiler Project (Smith), Conoco Phillips and Peabody's Kentucky NewGas Synthetic Natural Gas Production plant (NewGas), and Cash Creek Generation LLC's coal-fired Cash Creek Generating Station (Cash Creek). Because each facility qualifies as a "major emitting facility," see § 7479(1), and because each is proposed to be built in a county designated as an attainment area, all three facilities are required to obtain permits from the State of Kentucky. § 7475(a). The permits are part of the statutory Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program implementing the requirements of § 7475(a). Kentucky granted PSD permits to each facility prior to September 15, 2010. That fact is significant because until that date, the Kentucky State Implementation Plan failed to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act's PSD regulations.

 

    The Appeals Court explains that, "When neither the Administrator nor the state took action to prevent the construction of the nonconforming major emitting facilities, appellants, two environmentalist nonprofits (collectively referred to as Sierra Club), brought the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2), which provides for the filing of citizen suits against the Administrator for her alleged failure to perform any nondiscretionary duty under the Act. Arguing that her duty under § 7477 was discretionary, and therefore beyond the reach of the statute, the Administrator moved for dismissal. Agreeing with the Administrator, the district court ruled that the Administrator's decision not to exercise her statutory duty was discretionary, and thus not subject to judicial review. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 724 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2010). The district court entered a judgment of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sierra Club brought the present appeal."

 

    The Appeals Court explains its ruling on different grounds and said, "Although we hold that we do not lose jurisdiction over this controversy by reason of mootness, this does not resolve the jurisdictional theory upon which the district court relied in dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sierra Club, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43. The district court's ruling was based on the proposition that the Administrator's decision was discretionary and therefore not justiciable. Before this court, Sierra Club, which certainly does not concede that the district court should have dismissed the claim at all, argues that the analysis should have been under Rule 12(b)(6) to determine whether the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted rather than under the jurisdictional standards of Rule 12(b)(1). While it does not in the end affect the outcome, we ultimately agree that Rule 12(b)(6) should govern. We hasten to state that we do not fault the district court for basing its dismissal on Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 12(b)(6). The distinction between a claim that is not justiciable because relief cannot be granted upon it and a claim over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is important. But we cannot fault the district court, as this court 'ha[s] not always been consistent in maintaining these distinctions.' Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 527 (D.C. Cir.2009) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Indeed, we have provided authority both that discretionary duty claims fall outside our jurisdiction, and that such claims are nonjusticiable under Rule 12(b)(6). In Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA, we held that agency decisions excluded from judicial review by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) are outside the court's jurisdiction. 494 F.3d 1027, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ('In this case, subject matter jurisdiction turns on whether the Agreement constitutes a rulemaking subject to APA review, or an enforcement proceeding initiated at the agency's discretion and not reviewable by this court.'). Two years later, in Oryszak v. Sullivan, we came to a different conclusion."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [*Air, #CADC]

United States v. Mancuso

Jun 30: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Case No. 10-2420. In this unpublished order appealed from judgments of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The case involves sentencing of two brother who among other convictions, violated the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the conduct of asbestos removal.

 

    The Appeals Court ruled on many issues that were appealed and said, "Upon due consideration, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgments of conviction entered as to defendant Steven Mancuso on June 14, 2010; and as to Paul Mancuso on June 14, 2010, and January 10, 2011, are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the cases are remanded for resentencing consistent with this order. Steven and Paul Mancuso stand convicted by a jury on a common count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 371; to commit mail fraud, see id. § 1341; to violate the Clean Air Act (CAA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412, 7413(c); and to violate the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), see id. § 9603. Paul Mancuso was further convicted of six substantive CAA and CERCLA counts. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c), 9603(a)-(b). Steven Mancuso, who was sentenced to 44 months in prison."

 

    Both defendants fault the district court for applying a four-level enhancement for permitless disposal of a hazardous substance based on a Clean Water Act permit violation. The Appeals Court said regarding the environmental issues, "Although neither defendant objected to the enhancement below, we are here obliged to identify plain error. Our precedent prohibits application of § 2Q1.2(b)(4) when the environmental offense at issue 'did not 'involve' a permit violation,' even if the conduct contravened a different

statute's permit requirements. United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d at 100-01 (vacating enhancement based on state permit violation when defendant convicted of CAA offense because CAA does not require permit). Thus, the district court here plainly erred by applying the enhancement based solely on a Clean Water Act permit violation because the relevant CAA and CERCLA offenses did not involve permits. . ."

 

    Access the complete order with more details (click here). [*Air, *Remed, *Toxics, CA2]

(click here for information on getting the links and more information about eNewsUSA).

 

GET THE REST OF TODAY'S NEWS

For a limited time period -- THIS IS THE LAST DAY -- you can access today's complete issue of eNewsUSA without the links http://bit.ly/kPRdso.