Hinds Investment, LP v. Team Enterprises, Inc.

Aug 1: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-15607. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Plaintiffs Hinds Investments, L.P. and Patricia MacLaughlin (collectively, Hinds) appeal the district court's dismissal of their claims against manufacturers of dry cleaning equipment brought, inter alia, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. RCRA permits citizen suits against "any person . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B). [Note: See also the similar 9th Circuit case, Team Enterprises, LLC v. Western Investment Real Estate Trust, WIMS 7/27/11].

 

    The district court held that Hinds's allegations that the manufacturers contributed to waste disposal, by the design of machines that generated waste and by the instructions they gave on use of these machines, were insufficient as a matter of law to support a civil action under RCRA because all of the defendant manufacturers' alleged contributions were passive. The Appeals Court said, "We affirm. We hold that, for RCRA liability, 'contribution' requires more active involvement than was alleged as to the defendant manufacturers." The Appeals Court also noted in a footnote, "Hinds also appeals the dismissal of its other statutory and common law claims against defendant manufacturers. In a separate memorandum disposition filed along with this opinion, we affirm those rulings."

 

    The Appeals Court concluded, "We hold that to state a claim predicated on RCRA liability for "contributing to" the disposal of hazardous waste, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had a measure of control over the waste at the time of its disposal or was otherwise actively involved in the waste disposal process. Mere design of equipment that generated waste, which was then improperly discarded by others, is not sufficient."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here).  [#Remed, #Haz, #CA9]

Team Enterprises, LLC v. Western Investment Real Estate Trust

Jul 26: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-16916. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The Appeals Court explains that, "We must decide, among other things, whether the manufacturer of a machine used in the dry cleaning process may be held liable for contribution to environmental cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act." Plaintiff-Appellant Team Enterprises, LLC (Team) has, since 1980, leased space in a shopping center in Modesto, California, where it operates a dry cleaning store. From 1980 to 2004, Team used perchlorethylene (PCE), a volatile organic compound defined as a "hazardous substance" by the State of California, in its dry cleaning operation. Team's dry cleaning machines used PCE as part of the cleaning process, thereby generating wastewater containing the chemical.

 

    Team used Puritan Rescue 800 filter-and-still combination equipment (Rescue 800), designed and manufactured by Defendant-Appellee R.R. Street & Co., Inc. (Street), to filter and to recycle the PCE-laden wastewater for reuse. The Rescue 800 returned distilled PCE to Team's dry cleaning machines and deposited the resulting wastewater into an open bucket. Once in the bucket, some of the remaining PCE would separate from the water, allowing Team to recapture "pure" (or visible amounts of) PCE for reuse. The remaining wastewater contained dissolved -- and invisible -- PCE. Team disposed of this wastewater by pouring it down the sewer drain. Some of the PCE then leaked into the soil, and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board deemed the affected property in need of cleanup, which Team duly performed at its own expense.

 

    Team sued Street and several other defendants in the Eastern District of California, for contribution under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Team also alleged various state-law causes of action, including claims for trespass and nuisance. The district court granted summary judgment to Street on all claims and entered final judgment as to it. Team appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Team's CERCLA, trespass, and nuisance claims. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court decision.

 

    On the CERCLA claim, the Appeals Court said, "Team does not point to any evidence in the record that Street hooked up the Rescue 800 to the sewer, that Street continued to own the Rescue 800 used in Team's store, that Street owned or possessed the PCE that Team disposed of, that Street made dumping wastewater down the drain a condition of its sales contract with Team, or that Street employees poured wastewater down the drain at Team's stores. In short, there is a dearth of evidence indicating that Street exercised actual control over Team's disposal. Accordingly, we conclude that Team has not presented evidence giving rise to a genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to its CERCLA claim."

 

    The Appeals Court ruled in part, "Although Team presented evidence that Street instructed it to pour wastewater containing PCE into a bucket, there is no evidence in the record that Street 'instructed the dry cleaners to set up their equipment to discharge solvent-containing wastewater into the drains and sewers,' or that Street 'gave dry cleaners instructions to dispose of spilled [PCE] on or in the ground.' . . . And despite Team's protestations that once wastewater from the Rescue 800 had been poured into a bucket there was no alternative but to pour it down the drain, Team's alleged lack of alternatives do not indicate that Street engaged in the "kinds of affirmative acts or instructions" that would 'support a finding that [Street] assisted in creating a nuisance.'"

 

    The Appeals Court concludes, ". . .it is clear from the record that the Rescue 800 is not a disposal system. The Rescue 800 was not designed to route wastewater from the dry cleaning machines to the sewer; it was designed to filter and to recycle used PCE that otherwise would have been lost. We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that Team failed to present evidence giving rise to a genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to its nuisance claim."

 

    On the trespass issue the Appeals Court rules, "Team, however, did not present any evidence that either the Rescue 800 or the PCE entered the property without Team's consent. Moreover, Team's employees contaminated the soil by pouring the wastewater down the drain, and 'one cannot commit an actionable interference with one's own possessory right.' Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799. Because Team's contamination of the land was not a trespass against itself, Street may not be held liable for assisting in a trespass."

 

    In a separate concurring opinion, one Justice indicated, "I am pleased to join the majority's well-reasoned and insightful opinion. I write separately to explain my view that CERCLA, by its plain language, should not apply to this case. . . In this case, the undisputed evidence reveals that Street did not, at any point, own or possess the relevant PCE. Accordingly, Street is entitled to summary judgment on Appellant's CERCLA claim."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Remed, #CA9]

 

GET THE REST OF TODAY'S NEWS

Citizens For Balanced Use v. Erickson

Jul 26: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-35823. As explained by the Appeals Court, three conservation groups, Montana Wilderness Association, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, and The Wilderness Society (collectively, Applicants) appeal from the denial of their motion to intervene on the side of the defendants in an action brought by Citizens for Balanced Use (CBU) against Mary Erickson, in her official capacity as Supervisor of the Gallatin National Forest, and the United States Forest Service (Forest Service).

 

    In the underlying action, CBU challenged an interim order issued by the Forest Service in response to an adverse decision in prior litigation brought by Applicants. That interim order, which is the subject of this litigation, restricted motorized and mechanized vehicle use in a section of the Gallatin National Forest. CBU alleged that the challenged interim order violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977 (MWSA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it unduly restricted the use or possession of snowmobiles, tracked ATVs, and other over-snow vehicles.

 

    The Appeals Court said, "Because we conclude that Applicants satisfied the four requirements for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), we reverse and remand with instructions that the district court allow Applicants to intervene and become parties to the ongoing litigation, and that the district court take reasonable steps to put Applicants on equal footing with the original parties so as to ensure their opportunity for participation."

 

    The Appeals Court concluded, "Applicants showed, in a timely-filed motion, that they have a significant protectable interest in this action, that the disposition may impair their ability to protect that interest, and that the Forest Service may not adequately represent their interest. Applicants are entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a). We reverse and remand with instructions that Applicants be made parties to the litigation and that the district court promptly 'take all reasonable steps to put the new parties on equal footing with the original parties.' California ex rel. Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 445. Because the district court may soon rule on dispositive motions that could affect Applicants' interests, time is of the essence; the clerk is instructed to issue the mandate forthwith."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Land, #CA9]

 

GET THE REST OF TODAY'S NEWS

San Juan Citizens Alliance vs. Stiles (USDA & DOI)

Jul 21: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Case No. 10-1259. Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The appeal concerns the Northern San Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane project (the Project), which has been approved by the United States Forest Service (the Forest Service) and the Bureau of Land Management (the BLM). The Project contemplates the construction of numerous gas wells within the San Juan National Forest (the Forest) and on other federal lands. San Juan Citizens Alliance and four other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, SJCA) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the Forest Service, the BLM, and four government officials (collectively, the Federal Defendants) for alleged violations of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

 

    The suit contends that the 2007 record of decision (ROD) approving the Project was unlawful. Several companies holding valid leases in the area and interested in drilling for gas (the Lessees) were permitted to intervene as additional defendants. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. SJCA argues on appeal that the Project violates the NFMA because it is inconsistent with provisions of the San Juan National Forest Plan (the Forest Plan) protecting old-growth ponderosa pine forests, wildlife habitat, and riparian areas, and that the ROD approved individual wells under the Project that violate the Forest Plan's standards and guidelines protecting riparian areas.

 

    It further argues that the Federal Defendants violated NEPA in two respects when they prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the Project's environmental consequences: (1) the EIS did not adequately analyze the Project's

effects on the Forest's riparian areas, offering only perfunctory references to mitigation measures without evaluating how those measures could correct Forest Plan violations; and (2) the Federal Defendants did not include several nearby national parks and wilderness areas in its cumulative-impact analysis of the Project's effects on air quality and visibility.

 

    The Appeals Court affirmed in part and remanded in part saying the ripeness doctrine precludes us from addressing the merits of any of SJCA's challenges to the Project under the NFMA. A claim that the Project is inconsistent with the Forest Plan is not ripe until that inconsistency leads to the improper approval of a specific well (or associated construction). . . Because SJCA's NFMA claims that the Project is inconsistent with the Forest Plan are not ripe, we remand to the district court to vacate its judgment on those claims and to dismiss them without prejudice.

 

    The Appeals Court also ruled, "As for SJCA's NEPA claims, we reject them on the merits. First, the EIS's discussion of riparian-area mitigation measures is more than adequate to satisfy NEPA. An EIS assessing environmental consequences at the programmatic stage of a multi-step development project can properly discuss mitigation measures in general terms when the specifics of possible well locations are still uncertain, leaving for later a more complete analysis of environmental consequences associated with permitting a particular well site. Second, the Federal Defendants' decision on which public lands to include in the cumulative-impact analysis of air quality was a reasonable choice involving technical and scientific matters within their areas of expertise."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Energy/NatGas, #Land, #CA10]

 

GET THE REST OF TODAY'S NEWS

Conservation Force v. Salazar

Jul 22: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 10-15306. Appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. This case involves the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) from two hunters, Patricio Miguel Madero Blasquez and Colin Crook (plaintiffs), who attempted to import the leopard trophies from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs and Conservation Force, a nonprofit entity, filed suit against Federal defendants Ken Salazar (Secretary of the Department of the Interior), Rowan Gould (Director of FWS), Daniel Shillito (Regional Solicitor for the Department of the Interior), Carolyn Lown (Regional Assistant Solicitor for the Department of the Interior), and the FWS asserting that the administrative forfeiture of their leopard trophies violated the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause, and the Due Process Clause. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' CAFRA and constitutional claims.

 

    The Appeals Court explained further, "In this case, the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim is barred from judicial review. Plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures. Plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission. These petitions were reviewed by the Office of the Solicitor and denied. Because plaintiffs chose to pursue administrative remedies, they waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. See 50 C.F.R. § 12.24(a) (expressly providing that remedies are exclusive); Malladi Drugs, 552 F.3d at 889 (holding that the remedies are exclusive); Cole v. United States (In re $844,520), 136 F.3d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the remedies are exclusive). Accordingly, as it properly held, the district court properly dismissed the action."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). [#Wildlife, #CA9]

Lake Carriers' Association v. U.S. EPA

Jul 22: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Case No. 09-1001, consolidated with 09-1010, 09-1076, 09-1115. On Petitions for Review of a Final Action of U.S. EPA. Trade associations representing commercial ship owners and operators petition for review of a nationwide permit issued by U.S. EPA for the discharge of pollutants incidental to the normal operation of vessels. The petitioners raise a number of procedural challenges, all related to EPA's decision to incorporate into the permit, conditions that states submitted to protect their own water quality. The Appeals Court rules, "Because we find that the petitioners have not shown that the additional procedures they request would have had any effect on the final permit, we deny the petition for review."

 

    The Appeals Court explains the background saying Shortly after the CWA was enacted, EPA promulgated a regulation exempting incidental vessel discharges from the permitting (and therefore the certification) requirements of the Act. Exempted discharges included "sewage from vessels, effluent from properly functioning marine engines, laundry, shower, and galley sink wastes, or any other discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel." 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a). The regulation was in force for more than thirty years. Then, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision vacating the regulation, finding that EPA lacked authority to exempt incidental vessel discharges. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008) [See WIMS 7/24/08]. After a stay to allow EPA time to implement a means of issuing permits for vessel discharges, the regulation was finally vacated on

February 6, 2009.

 

    In response to the Ninth Circuit's decision, EPA developed a general permit, pursuant to section 402 of the CWA, to cover the incidental vessel discharges previously exempted by the regulation. See Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Discharges Incidental to the Normal Operation of a Vessel, 73 Fed. Reg. 79,473 (Dec. 29, 2008) [See WIMS 12/22/08]. The agency estimated that the Vessel General Permit (VGP) would cover discharges from approximately 61,000 domestic-flagged commercial vessels and 8,000 foreign-flagged vessels. Id. at 79,481. And unlike the majority of permits issued under section 402, which cover discharges originating in only a single state, the VGP would cover discharges in waterways throughout the United States.

 

    On December [29], 2008, EPA's final VGP became effective. Final NPDES General Permit, 73 Fed. Reg. at 79,47[3]. Part VI of the permit, which was not included in the draft VGP, is composed of approximately 100 state certification conditions. U.S. EPA, VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT (VGP) (2008), at 62-104 (J.A. 825-67). Vessels covered by the permit are required to adhere to the general provisions of the VGP with respect to all discharges, and are further required to adhere to any Part VI certification condition imposed by a state into the waters of which the vessel is discharging pollutants.

 

    In 2009, Lake Carriers' Association, Canadian Shipowners Association, and American Waterways Operators filed petitions for review of the final VGP. The petitions were consolidated into the single suit now before us. The trade associations raise three challenges. First, they contend that EPA erred in failing to provide notice and an opportunity for comment on the final VGP, which contained the state certification conditions. Second, they charge that it was arbitrary and capricious for EPA to issue the permit without considering the possible ill-effects of the state certification conditions. Finally, they allege that EPA failed to consider the costs of compliance with state conditions in assessing the impact of the permit on small businesses, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.

 

    The Appeals Court notes in part, ". . .we note that EPA's resolution of this matter does not leave the petitioners without recourse. If they believe that the certification conditions imposed by any particular state pose an inordinate burden on their operations, they may challenge those conditions in that state's courts. . . If they believe that a particular state's law imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, they may challenge that law in federal (or state) court. See Am. Trucking Ass'n, 600 F.3d at 628 n.1. And if neither of these avenues proves adequate, they are free to ask Congress to amend the CWA, perhaps by reimposing the exemption for incidental vessel discharges."

 

    The Appeals Court concludes in part, "In sum, given the case law and the arguments that EPA had before it, the agency correctly concluded that it did 'not have the ability to amend or reject conditions in a [state's] CWA 401 certification.' EPA Response to Comments, at 14-11 to 14-12 (J.A. 1062-63) (citing Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1997)). Under those circumstances, providing notice and an opportunity for comment on the state certifications would have served no purpose, and we decline to remand to require EPA to do a futile thing. . . The petitioners' remaining arguments fail for the same reason that their notice-and-comment argument fails. . ."

 

    Access the complete opinion (click here). Access extensive information on the Final Vessel General Permit from U.S. EPA (click here).  [#Water, #GLakes, #CADC]

 

GET THE REST OF TODAY'S NEWS

Western Watersheds Project, et al v. BLM

Jul 15: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 11-15799. Appealed from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. In a brief, unpublished opinion, the Appeals Court affirmed the district court denial of a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction and said, "Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. . . We agree with the reasons thoughtfully expressed by the district court and find no abuse of discretion. . . Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we affirm."

 

    The case concerns approval of a wind energy facility in Spring Valley, Nevada. Plaintiffs are two environmental organizations -- Western Watersheds Project and Center for Biological Diversity. Defendant is the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Intervening defendant is Spring Valley Wind, LLC, the energy company developing the wind facility at issue. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction in the district court seeking to bar the BLM from issuing a Notice to Proceed or otherwise authorizing construction and site clearing for the Spring Valley Wind Energy Facility which was set to commence on March 28, 2011.

 

    Plaintiffs claim the BLM conducted a "fast track" approval of the Spring Valley Wind Facility so that the project could take advantage of federal financing under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which required project approval by the end of 2010. It is alleged this approval process was pushed by high-level BLM officials and Spring Valley Wind, LLC proponents in violation of NEPA. Specifically, plaintiffs claim: (1) there are significant and unknown environmental impacts to the project site that warrant an EIS, not just an EA; (2) the BLM's decision provided no detailed statement of reasons establishing that the project's impacts are insignificant; (3) the BLM failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts without adequate scientific data, including impacts to bats and sage-grouse, and the cumulative environmental impacts of the project; (4) the decision did not properly consider or address public comments and opposing views; and (5) the final EA failed to consider an adequate range of alternative courses of action.

 

    The district court ruled that, "Having fully considered the administrative record and the arguments of the parties, and having weighed all relevant factors necessary for issuing a preliminary injunction -- the likelihood of success on the merits, the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest -- the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that a preliminary injunction should issue at this time. Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is denied."

 

    One of the Appeals Court justices wrote separately saying, "I concur in the result. I write separately, however, to express my concern about the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. . . agree with the majority that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the project's construction is unlikely to cause irreparable harm to bats or sage grouse. Nor did the district court err when balancing the equities in Defendants' favor or when considering the public's interest in the project. In my view, however, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because the BLM failed adequately to consider the potentially significant cumulative impacts of the project and other reasonably foreseeable future actions. . ."

 

    Access the unpublished opinion and separate concurrence and concern opinion (click here). Access links to the district court decision and additional briefs and documents from the Advocates for the West website who represented the Plaintiffs (click here). [*Energy/Wind, *CA9]